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The Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.36,
"System Safety Engineering and Management," directs the
Department of the Navy to establish formalized system safety
programs throughout the procurement and life cycle of all
systems, subsystems and equipment, and modifications there-
to, acquired by DOD. Ideally, the application of system
safety engineering and management techniques improves the
mission net cost-effectiveness of any DOD weapon system by
the prevention of accidental deaths and injuries, and by
minimizing material losses and damage to operational
systems. Even though DOD has directed significant attention
to the incorporation of system safety in current and future
weapon systems, the system safety program has been
criticized for its poor marginal contribution. In the past.
Naval system safety programs have struggled for survival and
recognition. With this in mind, the scope of this thesis is
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of system safety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of
the Navy (DON) have directed attention toward maintaining
operational readiness through early recognition of hazards
(see Figure 1.1) to prevent the loss or degradation of
systems. DODINST 5000.36 and OPNAVINST 5100. 24A provide
policy requirements for DOD and DON system safety programs.
Program requirements are detailed in MIL-STD882B, "System
Safety Program Requirements."
The Navy System Safety policy states that system Safety
Management Controls shall be applied to all Acquisition
Category-'- I and II programs throughout the system's or
facility life cycle. Program sponsors, acquisition commands
and their field activities shall selectively apply these
controls to all acquisitions and military construction
projects, system maintenance programs, logistics training
and operations and research programs leading to new systems
acquisitions. Engineering and management controls shall be
-^Acquisition Category (ACAT) —DON programs are
classified by ACATs which determine their level of review.
Programs are assigned an ACAT, i.e., I, II, III, or IV; when
first authorized based on estimated cost, criticality, and
political sensitivity. ACAT I-thresholds are $200 million
(Fiscal Year (FY) 80 dollars) in RDT&E funds or $1 billion
(FY 80 dollars) in procurement funds or both. ACAT Il-total
costs are expected to exceed $100 million for RDT&E and/or
$500 million for procurement (FY 80 dollars)
.
Hazard . An existing or potential condition that can result
in creating any of the four levels shown in this example. A

































































System Safety Hazard Severity for
a Weapon (Example)
applied through suitable tailoring of MIL-STD-882B to ensure
that primary emphasis is placed on the identification,
evaluation, and elimination/control of hazards prior to
system production/construction and deployment.
A study by the Logistics Management Institute made the
following comments regarding system safety in aircraft
acquisition:
The cost of Military aviation mishaps and safety
modification and retrofit programs exceeds $1 billion and
entails the loss of over 200 lives and 200 aircraft
annually. Better implementation of the Department of
Defense's system safety policies, plus some refinements in
those policies, can reduce these losses.
Successful system safety programs hold valuable
lessons for DoD.
- System safety investments can and do pay off. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Manned
Space Flight Program has had an intensive effort, with
heavy involvement of top management, in system safety
since the early Apollo fire. Their policy is, simply,
"no accidents. "2 It works.
- System safety does not require large investments to
be cost-effective. For example, a typical system
safety program investment (about $5 to $10 million
over 10 years for a major program) is well worthwhile
if it only results in preventing the loss of a single
aircraft ($15 million for the AH-64, $25 million for
the F-18, $200 million for the B-IB)
.
- An effective system safety program requires top
management interest and support. In the acquisition
process, the immediacies are schedule, performance,
and especially cost. Benefits from investments in
system safety show up primarily in the long run and
^This statement was factual until January 28, 1986,
when the loss of the space shuttle Challenger and all its
crew occurred in part because of an ineffective "silent
safety program" within NASA that allowed critical solid
rocket booster deficiencies to be treated as acceptable
flight risks. [Ref. l:p. 19]
then are observable only indirectly (i.e., as non-
accidents and the avoidance of safety modifications)
.
Investments in system safety are easily deferred by
those directly involved in an acquisition program.
Therefore, it is essential to have interest and
support of system safety by "offline" management at
levels high enough to be effective. [Ref. 2: pp. v-vi]
In the later part of 1986, the Naval Safety Center
requested funds for system safety for the following reasons:
System Safety Engineering is not being properly
incorporated into naval acquisitions. Specific problem
areas, highlighted by the Navy Inspector General, include
starting system safety programs too late, failure to
include system safety engineering as a life cycle process,
use of untrained Navy personnel as principals for safety,
use of unqualified personnel at contractor's facilities to
perform system safety analysis, and failure of program
managers to include any system safety requirements to a
large number of acquisitions. A significant problem
identified during Logistics Review Group audits is the
failure to track and correct known hazards. As a result,
the Navy establishment is suffering unneeded personnel
loses, injuries, system losses, and damage. These safety
mishaps combine to degrade operational readiness and
increase overall operating costs because engineering
changes are necessary to correct safety deficiencies.
Cost savings for an effective system safety program are
estimated as a minimum, at 4 to 1 over investment, and are
usually recouped by preventing the need for costly
engineering changes estimated at $1 million each or more.
[Ref. 3:p. 1]
The Naval Safety Center statement appears to be a
declaration of the failure by DON to properly ensure that
system safety requirements are achieved during the
development of a weapon system or facility as required by
DODINST 5000.36 and OPNAVINST 5100. 24A. This research
concentrates on the responsibilities required of DON to
accomplish an effective system safety effort and what cost-
benefits will be achieved from doing so.
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B. AREA OF RESEARCH
Research will be conducted to determine the cost
effectiveness of having a system safety program within the
Department of the Navy (DON)
.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
1. Is it cost effective to have a system safety program?
2. The subsidiary research questions are:
a. How do we determine the effectiveness of system
safety?
Can the effectiveness of system safety be measured?
b. Are current system safety programs within the Navy
being managed more or less efficiently? (i.e., are
there enough resources to do the job effectively or
are there too many resources being extended.)
c. What does it cost to make safety changes/modifica-
tions to a weapon system after fleet introduction?
Could these changes have been made earlier?
d. How are safety lessons learned (documented safety
hazards from previous weapon systems) subsequently
incorporated into the design process? Does
maintaining historical system safety data (lessons
learned) decrease the future costs of maintaining
an effective system safety program?
D. METHODOLOGY
In order to answer the primary and subsidiary research
questions, a combination of research techniques were used:
(1) A literature search was conducted to gather, analyze,
and summarize data on system safety and cost-beenfit/cost-
effectiveness techniques; (2) Personal interviews with key
professionals within NAVAIRSYSCOM, tenant activities and
11
supporting agencies were conducted. The data obtained
through the literature search and personal interviews was
used to postulate an appropriate measure of how to value the
cost-effectiveness of system safety.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter I states the reason for the basic problem area
being studied, identifies the primary and subsidiary
research questions and the intended methodology to be used
to answer the research questions.
Chapter II provides an in-depth review of what the
concept being studied is and the history of the concept.
The issue of system safety program support in the develop-
ment of aircraft weapon systems is addressed in detail. The
chapter concludes with the need for more resources being
devoted to the system safety concept.
Chapter III contains reviews of the following system
safety topics:
1) system safety program requirements and how important
the role of the organizational element within DOD
assigned acquisition management responsibility for
system safety is;
2) system safety objectives and the need for providing a
balance between management controls and system safety
risks; and
3) the system safety process is reviewed in order to
provide a logical approach to obtaining system safety
objectives.
Chapter IV defines benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness
analysis (BCA/CEA) . The history of BCA is provided along
12
with specific requirements of Executive Order 12291 (the
most recent regulatory requirements pertaining to BCA) . The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the difficulty
involved in doing a BCA on safety-related issues.
Chapter V discusses the term System Engineering and
System Engineering Specialties. System Safety is identified
as a system engineering specialty and is considered a
prerequisite to attaining cost, schedule, and technical
performance objectives in the development of a weapon
system. A 10 step standardized approach to conducting a
system engineering cost-effectiveness evaluation is
provided. Each step is briefly described. The chapter
concludes by defining what "system effectiveness" is. A
multi-attribute system effectiveness model is reviewed.
System Safety isn't currently considered a major program
objective in the multi-attribute model but could be if it
was identified as such. In conclusion, system effectiveness
models could be considered as one possible way of determin-
ing the cost-effectiveness of system safety.
Chapter VI contains a summary of the analysis and
provides conclusions.
F. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS
The Joint Services System Safety Panel and NAVAIRSYS-
COM's System Safety Department (09F) have requested assis-
tance in analyzing the cost effectiveness of system safety.
13
This study will contribute to finding an appropriate
measure.
14
II. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
The first section of this chapter contains a description
of what system safety is. This section is intended to
provide an understanding of the system safety concept and
the difficulty involved in measuring its cost and benefits
in the development of a weapon system.
The second section contains a review of the history of
system safety. This section provides necessary background
information concerning the current level of system safety
effort within DON.
The chapter concludes by addressing the need to
establish high level positions within DOD devoted to system
safety, and more specifically a need for more resources
being devoted to system safety at the Naval Air Systems
Command level.
A. WHAT IS SYSTEM SAFETY?
In 1972 the Army Safety Center in a technical report
made the following statement regarding system safety:
System safety as a discipline has not existed long enough
for the definitions of terms it uses to become universally
understood and accepted. A common problem in understand-
ing and evaluating a System Safety Program stems from
various definitions of the same terms being used which
leads to confusion and misunderstanding. [Ref. 4:p. 1]
A much more recent Air Force document stated:
It is difficult to explain the "why" and "hows" of the
System Safety discipline when there is a lack of agreement
15
within the discipline as to just what the task really is.
At a meeting of approximately 50 system safety engineers,
each engineer was asked to provide a definition of system
safety. Of these 50 fully-qualified and experienced
System Safety engineers, at least 30 had distinctly
different ideas of what constitutes the system safety
task. Very little standardization currently exist between
agencies or even between the directives, regulations, and
standards that implement the requirement. [Ref. 5:p. 1-
2]
The Department of the Air Force's Space Division
Headquarters puts the function of system safety into the
framework of a mishap-'- risk^ management program. For their
purposes, System Safety is discussed as: "A system
engineering approach to risk management which involves the
detection of systems, subsystems, components, or test and
operational sequences which have an element of risk." [Ref.
5: p. 1-2] In this context, the system safety program is
oriented in terms of program management as well as design or
development task performance. It examines the
interrelationships of all components of a program and its
systems with the objective of bringing mishap risk or risk
reduction into the management review process for automatic
consideration in total program perspective. It involves the
preparation and implementation of system safety program
-'-Mishap—an unplanned event or series of events that
result in death, injury, occupational illness or damage to
or loss of equipment or property.
2Risk—an expression of the possibility of a mishap in
terms of hazard severity and hazard probability. Risk
design goals are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
16























PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MISHAP
Figure 2.1 Risk Design Goals
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plans-^ ; also, the performance of system safety analyses on
both system design and operations, and risk assessment in
support of both management and system engineering
activities. The system safety activity provides the program
manager with a means of identifying what the mishap risk is,
where a mishap can be expected to occur, and what
alternative routes the design can make. [Ref. 5: p. 1-2]
Even though there seems to be no universally accepted
definition of system safety, the two most widely used
references pertaining to system safety define it as follows.
The System Safety Engineering and Management manual
which is intended to be the practicing system safety
professional's reference manual states:
System safety is the application of special technical and
managerial skills to the systematic, forward-looking
identification and control of hazards through the life
cycle of a project, program, or activity. The concept
calls for safety analyses and hazard control actions,
beginning with the conceptual phase of a system and
continuing through the design, production, testing, use
and disposal phases, until the activity is retired. [Ref.
6:p. 9]
Military Standard 882B defines system safety as:
The application of engineering and management principles,
criteria, and techniques to optimize safety within the
constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost
throughout all phases of the system life cycle. [Ref.
7:p. 3]
-^System safety program plan—a description of the
planned methods to be used by the contractor to implement
the tailored requirements of MIL-STD-882B, including organi-
zational responsibilities, resources, methods of accomplish-
ment, milestones, depth of effort, and integration with
other program engineering and management activities and
related systems.
18
Note the thrust and emphasis of this definition "...
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time
and cost. ..." This is not safety at any cost, but safety
within the constraints of the real world. [Ref. 8:p. 101]
Thus, system safety is a principal contributor to the
understanding and management of risk, with the objective of
reducing the cost of mishaps and the need for costly safety-
driven modifications after the system is put into operation-
al use. This reflects where we are in the real world today.
The current attitude towards system safety is that one
should find the best and safest way to perform desired
mission functions.
A formalized system safety program therefore provides
the program manager with an effective means of identifying
what risk elements exist and a means to evaluating their
interrelationship to all elements of a program. These risk
elements are most significant in the preventive mode and are
detected by system safety hazard analysis techniques (i.e.,
determine where a mishap can be expected to occur and
provide an alternative design approach) , and when corrected
by a design action results in either the control of, the
elimination of, or the softening of those effects identified
in the resultant mishap.
System safety is also a discipline which addresses all
aspects of safety, having its greatest impact when applied
during the early design and development stages of a new
19
system. Its basic orientation is to the total "system," and
includes anything that could cause or prevent accidents
(e.g. , hardware, software, people, environment) . Particular
care must be is given to subsystem interfaces, since that is
where accidents most often originate. [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]
A way of illustrating what system safety is to examine
case histories. Success (or failure) stories aren't logged
formally. However, examples abound where system safety
personnel identified hazards which were corrected before
accidents occurred and well before the problem would have
been identified otherwise. [Ref. 2:p. 1-4] The following
examples are illustrative:
- During the design of the F-18, an increase in fire
hazard was avoided when a system safety engineer
convinced program decision makers that a proposed
increase in allowable bleed air duct temperature was
dangerous. It was also pointed out that a similar
hazard could be avoided by ensuring that the bleed air
shutoff valve closed when power was removed. A change
was made accordingly.
- During a modification to the B-52, a system safety
engineer noted that if the front lugs of the air
launched Cruise Missile attachment retracted but the
rear ones did not, parts of the pylon would tear from
the wing and, together with the missile, would inflict
severe structural damage to the wing and possibly the
horizontal stabilizer. The system was redesigned.
- In a similar case, the CH-47D originally had a single-
point hook for load lifting. To improve load retention,
a three-point attachment was designed. The system
safety engineer discovered that if one hook were to hang
up with the others open, it was guite probable that the
aircraft could not be controlled, and a good chance
existed that cables might actually contact rotor blades.
The redesign assured that all hooks opened or none of
them did.
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- A safety engineer found in the PAVE LOW helicopter
system that loss of voltage in a radar circuit would
cause a command to the aircraft to fly at zero altitude
with no warning to the pilot. He also checked with
personnel on the RF-4C and A7D programs, knowing they
used the same system. All aircraft were quickly
prohibited from flying certain low-level missions until
the systems were corrected. [Ref. 2:p. 1-5]
The NASA/Army Rotor System Research Aircraft (RSRA)
project is one formally logged system safety program. The
executive summary from NASA Contractor Report 3534, "A
System Safety Model for Developmental Aircraft Programs,"
provides an overview of how the RSRA Project Manager/Chief
Engineer viewed system safety and applied the concept in the
development of this research aircraft. The executive
summary is contained in Appendix A. In the words of the
RSRA Chief Engineer,
The fact that the project matured effectively and without
incident is believed to be a direct result of the breadth
and depth of safety planning and the in-depth involvement
of all hands in the safety plan implementation. The point
is that the energies devoted to safety tasks are not all
penalties to be suffered out of the need for safety; these
efforts produce benefits that enhance operational
efficiencies, safety aside. [Ref. 9:p. 3]
Cases have also been reported where system safety
recommendations were not allowed—and an accident occurred.
For example, a project manager decided to eliminate a "roll-
over" fuel valve in a helicopter crashworthy fuel system on
the grounds of cost savings only to have it reincorporated
after an accident demonstrated the need for it. In a
similar instance, a change was made to an airplane for value
21
engineering reasons without system safety review, and the
changed configuration produced an accident. [Ref. 2:p. 1-5]
System safety engineers currently use terms such as
"increased safety" or "improved safety" concerning the
mission performance of a system. The difficulty with these
terms is measuring the increased or improved safety of a
system. Safety is, in reality, a characteristic such as
reliability, maintainability, or supportability, but harder
to guantify or measure. Yet, it should be pointed out that
these other fields (e.g., reliability, maintainability, and
supportability) play major roles in contributing to the
overall effectiveness of system safety. For example, an
aircraft that has fewer maintenance problems and is easier
to maintain has less chance of accidents/mishaps occurring.
Even though System safety is hard to quantifiably
measure, it has evolved as a highly technical discipline
employing a variety of safety engineering and management
tasks. These tasks include the preparation of accident
prevention plans and a variety of hazard analyses. Numerous
non-engineering system safety tasks (e.g., identification of
reguirements, accident/ incident investigation, feedback of
lessons learned, etc.) are also necessary for an effective
program. Thus, operations and management skills integrated
with engineering talents are the principal components of a
system safety program.
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Aircraft weapon systems developed prior to the advent of
system safety military requirements were usually based on
an after-the-fact philosophy of accident prevention. The
fly-fix-fly approach: build it and fly it, if it doesn't
work, fix it and try flying again. When an accident
occurred, an investigation was conducted to determine what
was the cause. If the cause was serious and could happen
again in the future, system modifications resulted, i.e.,
engineering change proposals, which are costly and can take
several years to implement.
With the advent of the system safety concept came a
planned, disciplined, systematically organized, and before-
the-fact process characterized as the identify-analyze-
control method of safety. An acceptable safety level is
designed into the system prior to actual production or
operation of the system by requiring timely identification
and evaluation of hazard (s) —an implied threat or danger
—
before losses occur. These hazards are eliminated or
controlled to an acceptable level to provide a system that
can be developed, tested, operated, and maintained safely.
Safety in a system may, therefore, be defined as a
quality of a system that allows the system to function under
predetermined conditions with an acceptable minimum of
accidental loss. [Ref. 6:p. 8] Yet, system safety is a
discipline where successes are usually not evident or
documented but where failures are highly visible; i.e..
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loss of life, major aircraft mishap, or severe design
deficiencies causing serious mishaps) . The measurability
and poor documentation problems surrounding the system
safety concept can be traced back to 1972 in an Army Safety
Center Technical Report 72-8, "Preparation of a System
Safety Program Plan for Aviation Systems Development," which
states:
MIL-STD-882 gives the general requirements for System
Safety Programs. Army experience in attempting to apply
the provisions of MIL-STD-882 directly in aircraft
development programs has indicated that there is
significant gap between the requirements as stated in the
standard and practical, realistic system safety programs.
The statement of philosophy and theory of the System
Safety concept in the standard and other literature alone
are insufficient to produce adequate system safety
programs for aircraft development. [Ref. 4: p. ia]
Even today, MIL-STD-882B isn't considered as an all-encom-
passing document that ensures system safety requirements
will be fully implemented. According to Mr. Jim Nerrie,
NAVAIRSYSCOM's System Safety Coordinator (AIR516C)
,
MIL-STD-882B is basically a generic document which must be
tailored to each program and by itself as a contractural
document doesn't ensure a program will have a successful
system safety effort. It requires more than that. The
contractor must have trained system safety personnel and
dedicated management support to ensure identified hazards
are eliminated not just given lip service. Furthermore,
the government i.e., more specifically program managers
and systems engineering professionals, must also be
concerned with system safety programs requirements.
Without government oversight or program office support,
the contractor will not fully support or properly
implement system safety program requirements.
Mr. Nerrie 's comment is further supported by a McDonald
Douglas System Safety engineer who stated: "System Safety
engineering requirements must be supported by the
24
government's program manager. If the program manager feels
system safety is an important task so will others within the
contractor's facilities." He also noted that Air Force
program managers seem to place more importance on system
safety issues, i.e., known identified hazards needing
program management resolution, than Navy Program Managers
do.
The 1972 Army report also reported that:
The System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) must be prepared and
used as a contractually binding document. If an SSPP is
written from this point of view, it will preclude the
incorporation of excessive discussions on theory and
philosophy. An SSPP is basically a management proposal
for an activity which, when approved, can be directly
implemented to produce tangible benefits in a program.
Consistent with the extent to which the Systems Engineer-
ing Process is formalized in a given project, the System
Safety Program Plan should be an essential, integral
element of that process. One of the advantages of doing
this, from a management point of view, is the use of
measurement techniques, employed by Systems Engineering to
show the progress in achieving certain objectives in the
program. System Safety can to a large extent, be
incorporated in such a technical performance measurement
system. When fully developed, a useful tool is then
provided that can measure and evaluate results obtained in
the System Safety Program, something that is difficult to
do at present. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Revision B of MIL-STD-882B doesn't specifically state
that an SSPP must be submitted with the contractors
proposal. It does state that an SSPP "may be" submitted
with the contractor's proposal and "be subject to" contract
negotiation, and upon approval by the managing activity, be
attached to the contract, referred in the statement of work,
and become the basis for contractural requirements. Even
though the MIL-STD-882B doesn't specifically state that a
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SSPP be a specific requirement prior to source selection,
most current aircraft programs do selectively apply Task
101, System Safety Program Plan, in contract-definitized
procurements, i.e., requests for proposals and statements of
work.
The Army technical report makes a valid point regarding
the gap between the requirements as stated in the standard
and practical, realistic system safety programs. A main
reason for this gap is more than just the practical
application of the system safety concept but that system
safety doesn't lend itself to any obvious operational
measurement; i.e., maintenance man-hours, mean-time-between-
fallures, or mean-time-to-repair. Technically, this is
probably the biggest reason the system safety concept has
had severe setbacks in the weapon system acquisition
process—i.e., "It doesn't lend itself to any obvious
measurement .
"
B. HISTORY OF SYSTEM SAFETY
One of the first public utterances on behalf of System
Safety occurred when Bill Steiglitz of Fairchild Aviation
gave a paper titled "Engineering for Safety" to the
institute of Aeronautical Science in September 1974. In it
he stated the following: "Safety must be designed and built
into airplanes, just as are performance, stability and
structural integrity. A safety group must be just as
26
important as part of the manufacturer's organization as are
stress, aerodynamics or a weights group." [Ref. 8: p. 103]
In 1969, the Department of Defense revealed that its
losses in Southeast Asia alone, up to 31 December 1968, were
1246 fixed-wing aircraft and 982 helicopters through enemy
action and 1247 fixed-wing aircraft and 1293 helicopters in
accidents. The total cost of losses due to accidents was
approximately $2.5 billion [Ref. 10:p. 4]. It is important
to note that this figure pertains only to the hardware cost
of losses, and doesn't include other costs due to losses
such as the value-of-lives-lost, disposal/clean-up costs, or
aircraft replacement costs.
During the 1960 's, the Department of Defense presumed
that a typical aircraft acquisition program for a training
command squadron would require 18 aircraft. [Ref. 10: p. 4]
A group of 12 squadrons would then need a total of 216
aircraft. An attrition allowance of 3.06 aircraft over a
five year period would indicate that 3 3 aircraft would be
lost in accidents and need to be replaced. Assuming this
was a fighter-attack aircraft costing approximately $6
million, attrition costs would be $198 million over that
time period. If one therefore, avoided the loss of one
aircraft a year over this five year period, the savings
would total $30 million in 1960 dollars. In current
dollars, the cost of fighter/attack aircraft is in excess of
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$24 million, so the savings today would actually be four
times as great.
It is ironic that avoiding aircraft losses and costs are
not the reason behind the military first requiring weapon
systems to have system safety. It was more of a concern
with unmanned systems, the intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) , that led to the development of the system
safety concept. The philosophy with aircraft was that a
pilot was a daring individual who lived with hazards because
he not only liked to but he had to. Hazards due to failures
were common but pilots were usually successful in overcoming
these aircraft mishaps. Designers devoted much time to
developing emergency procedures and equipment to be used by
pilots when failures occurred. The following are examples
of preventive measures taken by the designer or methods
engineer concerning pilot error prevention through design.
Causes of Primary Errors:
1. Failure to follow prescribed procedures
2. Failure to note critical indication
3. Lack of awareness of hazards
4. Lack of understanding procedures.
Preventive Measures:
1. Ensure that procedures are not hazardous or awkward
2
.
Provide suitable auditory or visual warning device,
that will attract operators attention
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3. Provide warnings, cautions, or explanations in
instructions
4. Ensure that instructions are easy to understand.
With the advent of the ballistic missile, there would be
no pilot on board if there was an accident in flight.
Designers had no one to devote time to for developing
emergency procedures or equipment.
In the early 1960 's, the Space Division, then the
Ballistic Missile Division was engaged in the operational
testing and site activitation of our first ballistic missile
systems. During this testing, they lost five CBM's silos,
at least five people, and had an extremely low launch-
success rate. The significant factor, prevalent in a large
percentage of these incidents, was that causes could be
traced to deficiencies in design, operational planning, and
ill-conceived management decisions. It became apparent that
accident prevention lay in the production and design of the
missile. Safety problems could only be solved by good
design. [Ref. 5:p. 1-1]
In April 1962, the Ballistics System Division of the
U.S. Air Force Systems Command produced their Exhibit 62-41,
"System Safety Engineering for the Development of Air Force
Ballistic Missiles." This document established system
safety requirements for the Associated Contracts on the
Minuteman Missile. This was the first formal system safety
effort. [Ref. 8:p. 103]
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In September 1963, the document was revised into Air
Force specification MIL-S-38130, "Military Specification-
General Requirement for Safety Engineering of Systems and
Associated Subsystems and Equipment." With very minor
revision, in June 1966, this specification was made a DOD
requirement, MIL-S-381308A. Finally, in July 1969, the
specification was revised further and became MIL-STD-882,
"System Safety Program for Systems and Associated Subsystems
and Equipment." Requirements for DOD approval of MIL-STD-
882 then became mandatory for a system safety program on all
procured products and systems. [Ref. 6:p. 12]
Even though DOD has directed that all DOD procured
products and systems have a system safety program, a study
done by the Logistics Management Institute in 1984 stated:
The Office of the Secretary of Defense could not
effectively discharge its responsibilities under existing
system safety policy instruction (DODINST 5000.36) due to
the lack of authorized positions for qualified personnel.
There were no experienced system safety professionals in
either the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (OASD (MRAL) ) or
in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering. The responsibility for system
safety in OASD (MRAL) is assigned to the Office of Safety
and Occupational Health Policy under the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety
Policy. The logical basis for the organizational
combinations of responsibilities for equal opportunity and
safety policy is obscure. Further, the Office of Safety
and Occupational Health Policy is erroneously perceived as
a social program, legislatively mandated by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, rather than a
management function directed at the conservation of high
value-resources. This, in turn is a symbol of a lack of
top-management understanding of and interest in system
safety. [Ref. 2:p. vi]
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In summary, the Naval aviation community has had long-
ter, decreases in major aircraft mishaps. Can these
decreases be attributed to having an effective system safety
program? The F/18 program ahs had an extensive system
safety program and currently has an attrition rate much
lower than had been expected or planned. Yet, within Naval
Air Systems Command current and future aircraft programs are
having fewer dollars and manpower resources expended on
system safety when compared to the F/18 system safety
effort. The need to save a few dollars now is ultimately
costing millions of dollars and lost lives in the future.
The current trend concerning system safety activities in the
Navy demonstrates a need for more support at the levels of
Chief of Naval Operations and Commander, Naval Air Systems Command.
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III. SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
The first section of this chapter reviews system safety
program requirements in the development of a weapon system.
In discussing these requirements, emphasis is placed on the
importance of the role of the managing activity-*- (MA) . The
MA has overall responsibility for implementing an effective
system safety program.
The second section gives the Department of the Navy's
system safety objective along with examples of several sub-
objectives contained in MIL-STD 882B. System safety
objectives help to provide a balance between identified
risks/hazards and the controls necessary to reduce or
eliminate them.
The final section provides a logical approach to follow
in obtaining system safety objectives. The intention of
this section is to provide a logical understanding of how a
system safety effort goes about identifying, and
eliminating, reducing and/or controlling hazards in the
development of a weapon system. Note the importance of
"lessons learned." Not only are lessons learned important
to begin the system safety process in the development of a
^Managing activity—the organizational element of DOD
assigned acquisition management responsibility for the
system, or prime or associate, contractors or subcontractors
who wish to impose system safety tasks on their suppliers.
32
new weapon system but also to end the system safety process
in guiding the development of future weapon systems.
A. THE ROLE OF THE MANAGING ACTIVITY (MA) IN ESTABLISHING
A SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
The principal objective of a system safety program
within DOD is to make sure safety, consistent with the
mission requirements, is designed into systems, subsystems,
equipment and facilities, and their interfaces.
Yet, the degree of safety achieved in a system depends
directly on the managing activity. The managing activity is
responsible for determining what definitized statements
concerning system safety are written into contractual
requirements. His role is also to require that emphasis be
given to safety during the system acquisition process and
throughout the life cycle of each system, ensuring mishap
risk is understood and risk reduction is always considered.
Early hazard identification and elimination or reduction of
risk to a level acceptable by the managing activity is the
principal contribution of an effective system safety
program.
MIL-STD-882B has provisions that assist in establishing
an effective system safety program effort; but in order to
do this, the managing activity must first establish, plan,
and implement a system safety program. The responsibility
and functions of those directly associated with enforcing
system safety policies and program implementation should be
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clearly defined, making that sure that all safety inputs to
program milestones and reviews are made.
Ensuring this compliance requires that tailored system
safety requirements be specified in contractual provisions
including the statement of work bidder's instructions,
Contract Data Requirements Lists, general and special
contract provisions sections, annexes, and other
contractural means. The System Specification must also be
thoroughly reviewed for inclusion of lessons learned from
previously documented safety requirements.
The MA is responsible for choosing those tasks from MIL-
STD-882B which should be imposed under contractual
agreements keeping in mind at all times that each task
produces an extra cost to the program. If a task is not
absolutely essential it should not be included. If a task
is only partially needed, it should be evaluated to
ascertain whether it should be either included in total or
tailored so as to require only the element of the task that
is essential to the program.
The following is a capsulated summary of the rationale
for each task contained in MIL-STD-882B [Ref. 8:pp. 9-12]:
Program Management and Control Tasks
TASK 100—Required to initiate the entire program. Must
be carefully tailored, especially for small programs.
TASK 101 - The contractor's 'battle plan.' This not only
tells the MA how the contractor is planning to run his
safety program, but, because it was prepared by the
contractor safety personnel and signed by the contractor
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management, the System Safety Program Plan is the safety
group's license to operate.
TASK 102—Needed to bring together the safety activities
of subs, associates and integrators. If there is but a
prime contractor, this Task is not required.
TASK 103—Establishes a requirement for the contractor to
present system safety program reviews which formally
report hazard analyses and other contractor requirements.
TASK 104—Provides for establishment of special safety
groups and System Safety Working Groups.
TASK 105—This task if of utmost importance because it
establishes a requirement for closing out hazard action
items.
TASK 106—Establishment of a Test & Evaluation program.
Needs to be done early in the program!
TASK 107—"When," "What" and "Who to" for progress
reports.
TASK 108—Are there to be minimum qualification
requirements for System Safety personnel? If so, the
requirements are set forth in this task.
Design and Engineering Tasks
TASK 201—Preliminary Hazard List. The first look at
potential hazards. Some of the items on this list may
later prove to be of little concern. Additional hazards
will be considered as the program progresses.
TASK 202—Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) . Document in
accordance with DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard
Analysis Report. The format for the PHA may or may not be
specified by the MA.
TASK 203—Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SHA) . Document in
accordance with DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard
Analysis Report. The format needs to be the same for the
prime and all subs, associates, et cetera. Usually a
matrix format for reporting.
TASK 2 04—System Hazard Analysis. This document
interfaces 'safetied' subsystems.
TASK 2 06—Occupational Health Hazard Assessment. Document
as with hazard analyses. Toxicity, hazardous materials
and their waste, handling of hazardous items, protective
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clothing and devices. Document in accordance with DI-
SAFT-80106.
TASK 207—Safety Verification. Were the requirements,
specifications, standards, regulations, and guidelines
observed and met? Document with DI-SAFT-80102 , System
Safety Assessment Report.
TASK 208—Training. How is training to be performed and
who is to be trained. Details are contained in the System
Safety Program Plan.
TASK 209—Safety Assessment. Use DI-SAFT-80102, Safety,
Assessment Report which lists and discusses residual
safety problems, special controls and procedures.
TASK 210—Safety Compliance Assessment. Document with DI-
SAFT-90102, Safety Assessment Report. Wrap-up
verification of the safety status of the completed system.
On a low-risk system, this may be the only analysis
report.
B. SYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES
The Department of the Navy's System Safety Objective as
stated in OPNAVINST 5100. 24A is:
The objective of a system safety program is to improve
operational readiness and reduce costs by using system
safety design and analysis techniques.
The Naval Air Systems Command System Safety Objective as
stated in NAVAIRINST 5000. 3B is:
To identify hazards induced by design, design anomalies,
proposed operational and maintenance procedures, and
personnel errors sufficiently in the acquisition process
to permit resolution prior to the end of full scale
development.
System Safety Program Objectives as stated MIL-STD-882B
are:
The system safety program shall define a systematic
approach to make sure:
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a. Safety, consistent with mission requirements are to
be designed into the system in a timely, cost
effective manner.
b. Hazards associated with each system are to be
identified and then evaluated and eliminated or the
associated risk reduced to a level acceptable to the
MA throughout the entire cycle of a system.
c. Historical safety, including lessons learned from
other systems, are to be considered and used.
d. Minimum risk is to be sought in accepting and using
new designs, materials, and production and test
techniques.
e. Actions are to be taken to eliminate hazards or
reduce risks to a level acceptable to the MA.
f. Retrofit actions required to improve safety are to
be minimized through the timely inclusion of safety
features during research and development and
acquisition of a system.
g. Changes in design, configuration, or mission
requirements are to be accomplished in a manner that
maintains a risk level acceptable to the Managing
Activity.
h. Consideration is to be given to safety and ease of
disposal and demilitarization of any hazardous
materials associated with the system.
i. Significant safety data are to be documented as
"lessons learned" and submitted to data banks or as
proposed changes to applicable design handbooks and
specifications.
System Safety objectives can be thought of as producing
a balance between risks and controls to eliminate/reduce all
identified hazards. [Ref. 6: p. 17] The job of producing
this balance is risk management and is illustrated in Figure
3-1 in which risk factors are weighted against controls










Source: [Ref. 6:p. 17]
Figure 3.1 Risk Management Control Model
System Safety controls are engineering practices which
should be performed such that mission requirements are met
in a cost-effective manner with the overall goal being the
formation of an accident prevention program for the total
weapon system. This entails not only performing system
safety engineering practices but developing operational
safety controls and participating in accident/incident
investigations.
In this context, a system safety program is oriented in
terms of program management as well as design or development
task performance. It examines the interrelationships of all
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components of a program and its systems with the objective
of bringing mishap risk or risk reduction into the
management review process for automatic consideration in a
total perspective. Most important it verifies implementa-
tion and effectiveness of hazard control. What is generally
not recognized in the system safety community is that there
are no safety problems per se in system design. There are
only engineering and management problems, which if left
unsolved, can result in a mishap. When a mishap occurs, it
then is considered a safety problem. Identification and
control of mishap risk is then an engineering and management
function. [Ref. 5:p. 1-2]. Note the thrust of this
statement: system safety is equivalent to mishap risk
management. Fundamental to mishap risk management is the
requirement that competent and responsible safety management
be assigned with sufficient authority so that there is a
continuous safety overview of the technical and management
planning aspects of the entire program. Keeping in mind
that the ultimate responsibility of preventing a mishap
belongs to the Program Manager who in essence is the MA.
C. THE SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS
Although there may appear to be some mystical steps in
performing system safety, the system safety process is a
logical, engineering approach for obtaining the system
safety objectives required by the managing activity. [Ref.
10 :p. 109] The steps of this process can be followed in
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sequence at any level of system complexity without
destroying the basic idea. The process is repeated as
necessary during the system life cycle. What follows is a
step-by-step explanation of the System Safety Process as
applied to any system.
The System Safety Process can begin at any point in the
life cycle of a system, but its greatest advantages are
achieved when it is first applied very early in the cycle.
It is not too early to begin applying the process during
initial concept studies which will ultimately lead to the
production and use of a system. [Ref. 4:p. 34] The system
safety process consists of the following steps.
1. Lessons Learned
The process begins with the review of Lessons
Learned from previous weapon systems. This represents the
sum total of experience and knowledge gained from previous
operations of systems related to the one under
consideration. This experience and knowledge will rarely
exist in any one place, so the effectiveness of the
remainder of the process will depend on the ability to
concentrate pertinent information at the point required for
its use. Of particular interest are those measures taken
previously to correct design features which have resulted in
injuries and deaths or accidental damages and losses.
Design features which have not proven unacceptably hazardous
are also included here. Thus, the process logically begins
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The design of any new system must be predicated on
the definition of the system and its bounds. The second
step in this process is to clearly state just what system is
under consideration. Any entity can be labeled a "system"
as long as it is accurately defined. The boundaries of the
system and its elements must be defined as early as possible
and revised as required during the system life cycle.
Included in this area is the definition of the system
operating condition, environmental situation, and the human
role in system operation. Such delineation establishes the
limits for succeeding steps in the process and reduces
complex systems to manageable parts. For instance, if an
aircraft system is being considered, it is essential to know
whether the crew is being thought of as part of the system
or not. Careful attention to this step prevents confusion
later in the process.
3 System Hazard Analyses
The heart of the System Safety Process is the
analysis of a system and its elements in a comprehensive and
methodological manner. Beginning with the Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the design concept and continuing
through the System Hazard Analysis (SHA) of the complete
system, this analytical process utilizes various techniques
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to systematically examine the system for potential hazards.
The detailed methods and techniques for performing these
analyses are selected based on their suitability for the
particular system element under consideration and the
applicable level of detail in the design. It is in this
step that before-the-fact accident prevention has its
beginning. The key to doing this lies in the comprehensive
and methodical approach to analysis. By comprehensive, it
is meant that everything which could happen to the system is
thought of in terms of the consequences which may result.
The analyst continually asks the question, "What if such-
and-such happens?" To do this without getting hopelessly
bogged down in complex details requires a methodical or
systematic approach to the analysis. Many analytical tools
for this are available and in use today. The result is a
high degree of confidence that no stone has been left
unturned in the search for possible system hazards.
4 . Hazard Identification
Through the systematic hazard analyses described in
the previous step, the designer or engineer identifies those
features of a system which potentially may cause injury,
damage, or destruction. The primary reason for going
through the analysis is to arrive at this step. A hazard
must be identified before it can be eliminated or
controlled. As the design progresses, additional hazards
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may be identified during successive iterations of the System
Safety Process.
5. Hazard Catecforization and Evaluation
To eliminate every hazard identified in the previous
step is usually going to be impractical. For example,
analysis of a helicopter system will show that separation of
a rotor mast is a hazard with catastrophic consequences. As
a result, we can make the mast stronger or more reliable,
but we can neither eliminate the hazard nor give 100 percent
assurance that it will never fail. Similar situations arise
in examining the role of the human in a manned system. It
is unlikely that we will ever totally eliminate his
potential for making mistakes. A procedure is developed by
which hazards identified through the analytical process can
be categorized and evaluated for the purpose of enabling
decisions to be made with regard to appropriate corrective
action. The following criteria should be used in developing
this procedure:
- Hazards are evaluated to determine the worst potential
consequences which would ultimately occur if the hazard
is not eliminated or controlled.
- Consequences or effects of hazards are expressed in
terms of their impact on mission effectiveness, their
effect on personnel and materiel failure or malfunction.
- Effects on personnel and material are classified to
levels or degrees of severity.
- The probability of hazard manifestation under the
various operating conditions is determined.
- The resources of penalties required to eliminate or
control an identified hazard are determined in terms of
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cost (dollar value of policy procedure revisions,
manpower, technology, facilities, materiel, etc.)
schedule, and system performance.
A means by which identified hazards can be arranged in
order of priority for corrective action is developed. It is
here that judgement must be applied to ensure that maximum
practical benefits are derived from this process.
Responsibility for accomplishing this step is usually vested
in the management of a system program as an essential
element in the decisi making process necessary to identify
alternatives and to i e appropriate corrective action.
6 . Action (s) to E,-minate or Control Hazard (s)
Nothing that has been done so far in the system
safety process will prevent the first mishap. The process
produces no useful result until some action is actually
taken to eliminate or control the hazards that have been
identified. Without proper and timely action, the process
becomes ineffective. However, all steps taken up to this
point have been designed so that the most appropriate action
can be taken. Again, management is responsible for this
step. This responsibility includes the decision and
direction for action, plus the allocation of resources
required to do the job. This is perhaps the most crucial
step in the entire process because it is here that practical
results are actually achieved.
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7.
Modification of System Element (s)
Any action taken in the previous steps will result
in the modification of some element or elements of the
system. This modification need not only involve hardware.
For example, procedures can be revised, initial assumptions
on operating environment can be amended or basic
specifications can be changed. Since action modifies the
system, the initial definition of the system or its elements
also change, so the delineation of the system in step B must
be revised accordingly. The process is then repeated, as
required, until such time as no unacceptable additional
hazards are generated by the system modification. These
repetitive steps ensure that actions taken to correct one
hazard do not induce other hazards somewhere else in the
system.
8 Effectiveness Evaluation of Action Taken
Up to this point in the process, hazards identified
in the system through analysis have been eliminated or
controlled within practical program limitations. If the
technology of today were able to give up 100 percent
assurance that we were 100 percent correct in all we have
done so far, the process could end here. Since we cannot
give these assurances, some measure of effectiveness is
needed. Effectiveness is evaluated against the extent to
which the system safety objective has been attained. A
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satisfactory evaluation results in increased assurance in
the level of safety of the system.
9 . Accident Incident Analysis
The occurrence of an accident or incident, of
course, leads to an unsatisfactory effectiveness evaluation.
In this step, any mishap is examined critically to determine
causes and evaluate effects. The causes and effects could
range from something already predicted as possible, or even
probable under certain circumstances, to something entirely
new and surprising. The results of this mishap analysis
should then reveal deficiencies in the System Safety Program
and serve to direct corrective action back to the
appropriate step in the process. In this way, maximum use
is made of the mishap experience, without having to go back
and continually rediscover new truths.
10. Component/System Test and Demonstration
The inadequacy of analytical techniques alone in
identifying all system hazards is determined in step H.
Most, if not all, development programs for complex systems
include testing to verify performance and the demonstration
of system capabilities. Both of these activities are, in
essence, assuring functions. They are conducted to assure
the user that his system performs as it is supposed to.
System safety is also an assumption. Tests and
demonstrations normally performed on a system or its
components are planned and conducted to reveal inadequacies
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in the System Safety Process. At the same time, these tests
and demonstrations serve to verify the results of the
process and give greater confidence in the assurances
provided. As with the results of mishap analyses,
deficiencies uncovered in this step are directed to the




In those areas where the effectiveness evaluation
(Step 5) and test and demonstration (Step 7) indicate that
the System Safety Process has produced the desired results,
assurance that the system safety objective has been met is
increased correspondingly. This increased assurance is then
applied the next time we go through the process, an element
of system qualification, or in applying the process to
another system. In this manner, we continually build on
past processes, while simultaneously correcting
deficiencies.
12 Final Step
The final step is to document whatever new lessons
learned were developed so that they will be available for
consideration in future systems. [Ref. 4:pp. 34-37]
This is the System Safety Process. At first glance,
the overall picture may seem complicated and confusing. But
when each step is considered individually, a logical and
progressive pattern develops. It is really no more than a
specialized problem solving process, one step leading
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naturally to the next. The System Safety Process also has
several distinct characteristics which enable it to be
applied in a practical manner. Provisions are made to
repeat the steps as often as necessary to achieve the
desired results. There are no blind alleys. The process
can be applied at any level of system complexity, from broad
general design concepts to the final details of a subsystem.
Another significant practical characteristic of the process
is that is prescribes the application of judgement and
management decisions at the juncture between what is ideal
and what is practical. Thus, the System Safety Process
produces results which are consistent with the definition of
system safety, attainment of an ". . . optimum degree of
hazard elimination within the constraints of operational
effectiveness, time and cost." [Ref. 4:p. 37]
Actually, the applications of the System Safety
Process is not simple. But neither is a sophisticated
weapon system simple. The advantage of the process lies in
being able to examine such extremely complex subjects in
simpler related parts. This examination proceeds in a
logical and orderly fashion from one part to the next until
the entire complex subject is covered. [Ref. 4: p. 37]
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
Benefit-cost analysis, when used as a central element
in making certain public investment decisions, forces
careful consideration of problem identification, solution
comparisons, and the specific impacts and opportunity
costs associated with the investment of public funds.
James J. Goshling and Lowell B. Jackson
The process of identifying acceptable public projects
has become identified with the term benefit cost analysis
(BCA) . The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the
fundamental concept of BCA. The chapter will:
a. define benefit-cost analysis
b. define cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)
c. provide a historical overview of benefit-cost analysis
d. review provisions of Executive Order 12291—Federal
regulatory requirements regarding BCA
e. end with an assessment of the difficulties involved in
doing a BCA/CEA on safety related issues.
A. DEFINITION OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Among noneconomists, "benefit-cost-analysis" and "cost-
effectiveness analysis" are often considered to be
"techniques" for appraising public projects. A "cost-
effectiveness analysis" is considered to be a special form
or subset of BCA distinguished by the difficulty with which
project benefits can be identified in terms of dollars.
Peter Sassone and William Schaffer define a benefit-cost
analysis as an "an estimation and evaluation of net benefits
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associated with alternatives for achieving defined public
goals." [Ref. ll:p. 2]
J.D. Bentkover states, "Benefit-cost analysis has, in
many policy contexts, been considered any analytical method
that enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of
alternative actions." When interpreted in economic terms,
it is a pragmatic realization of the theory of welfare
economics, providing a specific organizing framework and a
set of procedures to summarize information and display
tradeoffs associated with these actions
—
generally in
monetary terms. In more stricter economic considerations,
BCA judges actions strictly on an efficiency criterion. A
positive aggregation of net benefits implies the prospects
for improvement in resource allocation. [Ref. 12 :p. 13]
Cost-benefit analysis as a generic term embraces a wide
range of evaluation procedures which leads to a statement of
assessing costs and benefits relevant to project
alternatives. The variety of problems addressed and the
ingenuity which must be exercised in existing costs and
benefits make it particularly difficult, if not impossible,
to design an all purpose BCA procedure. Several general
principles may be stated, but an all-encompassing procedure
cannot be defined. [Ref. ll:p. 3]
The basic notion of BCA seems to be simple. If we have
to decide whether to do A or not to do A, the rule is: "Do
A if the benefits exceed those of the next best alternative
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course of action, and not otherwise. If we apply this rule
to all possible choices, we will generate the largest
possible benefits, given the constraints in which we live."
Going one step further, we must consider the "benefits
of the next best alternative to A." The alternative
benefits to A will then be labeled to the "costs of A," for
if A is done the alternative benefits are lost. The rule
is: "Do A if its benefits exceeds its costs, and not
otherwise.
"
The concept of BCA so far seems quite simple, yet,
problems arise in measuring the identified benefits and
costs, and then justifying why project A is better than
project B. There must exist some means of comparing the
various dimensions along which A and B differ.
Some people believe that one particular attribute of
life, such as silence of the countryside, is of absolute
importance. For them cost benefit analysis is easy: the
value of all other benefits and costs is zero. More
problematic are those people who believe in the absolute
importance of two or more items, for them they are doomed to
intellectual and spiritual frustration. Whenever A is
superior to its alternative on one count and inferior on
another, they will be obliged to do both. Unfortunately,
choices between such alternatives have to be made only too
often and its impossible to make rational choices unless
every item has a unique price. Its sufficient to know that
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the price lies within some range, the answer will be
unaffected by having an exact price. The basic principle is
that we assign numerical values to benefits and costs, and
arrive at decisions by adding then up and accepting those
projects whose benefits exceed their costs. [Ref. 13 :p. 10]
How are these values to be arrived at? If only people
matter, the analysis would involve the following two steps:
1. How does the decision affect the welfare of each
individual concerned? To judge this effect you must
rely on the individual's own evaluation of his mental
state and then measure his change in welfare as he
himself as he himself would value it; i.e., What
would he be willing to pay to acquire the benefits or
to avoid the costs. These costs don't have to be in
monetary terms. They could well be bottles of beer.
Yet the problems of inferring people's values from
their behavior are clearly made and illustrate the
central problem in doing a BCA. [Ref. 13 :p. 10]
2. How do you deduce the change in social welfare implied
by all changes in individual welfare? Unless there
are no losers, this means somehow valuing each man's
welfare. If incomes were optimally distributed, each
person's welfare would be equally valuable regardless
of whose it was, which means that each man's welfare
has equal weight. If incomes are not optimally
distributed, economists argue that it should be
redistributed by cash transfers rather than through
the choice of projects. But what if welfare cannot be
redistributed, even if it should be; the poor man's
welfare may need to be valued more highly or have more
worth than the rich man's welfare. [Ref. 13 :p. 10]
This raises the question that underlies almost all
disputes about BCA: Which constraints are to be taken as
given? And what about the constraints outside the realm of
the decision-maker? This brings us to the relationship
between BCA and public policy. The government's overall aim
is presumably to ensure that social welfare is maximized:
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subject to those constraints over which it has no control;
i.e., such as tastes, technology and resource endowments.
In any economy this objective requires some government
activity owing to the failure of free markets to deal with
the efficiency problems of externalities; economies to
scale, inadequate markets of risky outcomes, and the equity
problem of the mal-distribution of wealth. [Ref. 13 :p. 11]
The great strength of BCA is that it permits
decentralized decision-making. This is needed because no
one public office can hope to handle the vast mass of
technical information needed to decide on specific projects.
But yet it requires the assumption that right decisions will
only result if the prices used by the decision-maker reflect
the social values of input and output at the social optimum,
or what are usually called their "shadow prices." [Ref.
13 :p. 9] In a mixed economy, market prices often do not do
this. This poses another problem in doing a BCA; i.e., to
arrive at adequate and consistent valuations where market
prices fail. If any of the activities of government
agencies are non-optimal then another problem arises in
doing a BCA, i.e., the difficulty in finding relevant
prices, namely whether and how to allow for those
divergences between market prices and those social values
that arise from the action or inaction of government itself.
[Ref. 13:p. 12]
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Edward Gramlich wrote of BCA that "ultimately, it is
nothing more than a logical attempt to weigh the pros and
cons of a decision. And ultimately, something like it must
necessarily be employed in any rational decision." [Ref.
14 :p. 3] James Campen states that "this injunction that one
should undertake a proposed action if and only if its
advantages (benefits, pros) outweigh its disadvantages
(costs, cons) is without practical content." Campen 's
concern is with BCA as a systematic, quantitative approach
to the comparative evaluation of governmental expenditure
and regulatory alternative. [Ref. 15: p. 15]
With this in mind, the goal of BCA is to identify the
alternatives that will make the most efficient use of
society's scarce resources in promoting social objectives,
that is—that will provide the maximum net social benefits.
A BCA is carried out from a social or public point of view
rather than from the private, profit oriented perspective
that guides the financial analyses undertaken by firms or
individuals; it attempts "to take account of all of the
effects of a project on members of the public, irrespective
of who is affected and of whether or not the effect is
captured in a financial account." [Ref. 16 :p. 24]
There is a spectrum of views of the nature of "Decision
Makers," and of the decision-making process. One end of the
spectrum envisions decision-makers commissioning BCA's and
then taking their results into account in making more or
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less unilateral decisions. The other end of the spectrum
sees benefit-costs analysts as providing inputs to a wide
range of individuals and groups who participate in a
pluralistic political process of outcome determination. All
along the spectrum, BCA is viewed as an essentially neutral
technique for providing helpful input to legitimate and
effective decision-makers who function to represent the
interests of the entire population and thereby to promote
social welfare. [Ref. 15:p. 26] One text states, for
example, that "government is really the collective
expression of the will of taxpayers" [Ref. 14 :p. 26] and
another explains that BCA is "carefully designed to ensure
that public decisions accurately reflect what it is that the
society wants to accomplish" [Ref. 17:p. 26].
One school of thought-called the conventional approach
by E.J. Mishan who is its most forceful and persistent
advocate—maintains that BCA's, like engineering analyses,
ought to be based only on objective, scientifically
observable data and generally acceptable principles. In
this view the objective of scientifically observable data
relevant to a BCA are market data, and the only generally
acceptable economic principle for evaluating alternative
outcomes is that of economic efficiency, or maximization of
total net benefits evaluated on the basis of market data.
According to the conventional approach, there should be no
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special relationship between decision-makers and analysts.
[Ref. 15:p. 26]
The other school for thought—called the decision-
making approach by Robert Sugden and Alan Williams, who are
its most systematic and persuasive advocates in the texts
under review, and labeled "revisionist" by Mishan—maintains
that there should be a much closer relationship between
decision-makers and analysts. Decision-makers should
actively use analysts to obtain information and analysis
that will be useful to them in identifying those most
productive in reaching their goals. In this view, the
analyst serves essentially in a staff role to the decision-
maker and an analysis does not stop with "objective" market-
based data. [Ref. 15:pp. 26-27]
The conception of the role played by benefit-cost
analysis (and analysts) in the process of determining what
proposed expenditures and regulations are actually
undertaken is a central element of the BCA paradigm. This
conception may be summarized by saying that benefit-cost
analysts play the role of technicians, providing information
and analysis to politically responsible decision-makers.
The decision-makers must then somehow combine the
information and analysis received from benefit-cost analysts
with other considerations in the final process of reaching a
decision. As one text puts it: "Sound expenditure
decisions, whether made by the legislator or the executive,
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require detailed information regarding the merits of
alternative projects." [Ref. 15 :p. 25] "The technician can
perforin an important service in providing this information."
[Ref. 18 :p. 25] Another makes the point this way: "A
well-conducted cost-benefit study can be only a part, though
an important part, of the data necessary for informed
collective decisions." [Ref. 19:p. 25] And a third: "CBA
is an 'input,' an 'aid,' an 'ingredient' of decision-
making. It does not supplant political judgement." [Ref.
20:p. 25]
BCA shares the public policy perspective of most of
current mainstream economics, according to which the major
purpose of economic analysis is to contribute to the formu-
lation and adoption of improved public policy. The
provision of reasoned arguments, relevant information, and
insightful analyses can make a positive contribution to
better decisions and hence to improved social welfare. The
characterization of the role of BCA that was articulated in
a highly influential survey article a quarter of a century
ago reflects the view of the BCA paradigm:
The economist must interpret the desires of the policy
people whom he is serving and express them in an
analytical form as an objective function. He then seeks
to maximize the function, given the empirical relations in
the economy and the institutional constraints that may be
appropriate to the analysis. In this manner, the
economist can play the role of technician, of bringing his
technical equipment to bear on policy problems, with
maximum effectiveness. [Ref. 15:p. 25; emphasis added]
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are
In conclusion, elements involved in carrying out a BCA
Determining the role of BCA in the overall processes of
decision-making and outcome determination: This
involves answering such questions as, For whom is the
analysis being done? How will it be used on its
completion? What conceptions of government and of the
political process underlie the BCA paradigm?
Determining the social goals that provide the basis for
the comparative evaluation of proposed alternatives:
Costs and benefits can be identified and measured only
relative to specific criteria or objectives that
determine what is to be maximized. In the jargon of
economics, it is necessary to specify an objective
function that will provide the basis for valuing costs
and benefits.
Identifying, correctly and comprehensively, the benefits
and costs of the proposed alternatives, and then
measuring each type of benefit and cost: This involves
determining the value of benefits and costs at the time
that they occur and for the people directly affected.
Combining, or aggregating, all of these benefits and
costs together in order to determine an overall summary
measure of an alternative's net benefits: Three
particular types of aggregation are given a great deal
of attention by the BCA paradigm: (1) aggregating
benefits and costs that occur in different time periods
(that is, dealing with the issue of discounting) ; (2)
aggregating benefits and costs that accrue to different
individuals or groups of people (that is, dealing with
distributional issue) ; and (3) aggregating circumstances
(that is, dealing with risk and uncertainty)
.
Reaching a conclusion: This may involve using an
appropriate criterion for choosing among proposed
alternatives on the basis of their total benefits and
costs as determined in the preceding stages of the
analysis. More generally, it involves presenting the
results of the benefit-cost analysis in a way that is
appropriate in light of the first two elements
identified here—the role of the analysis in the overall
decision-making process and the nature of the objective
function adopted for the analysis. [Ref. 15: p. 27]
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B. DEFINITION OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
The military effectiveness or military worth of any given
weapon system cannot logically be considered in isolation.
It must be considered in relation to its cost—and, in a
world in which resources are limited, to the alternative
uses to which the resources can be put. Military require-
ments are meaningful only in terms of benefits to be
gained in relation to their cost. Accordingly, resource
costs and military worth have to be scrutinized together.
[Ref. 21:p. 26]
The above quotation perhaps best expresses what "cost-
effectiveness" is about—the obtaining of maximum desired
benefits at the minimum expenditure of resources.
Regardless of the scale or character of the system to be
evaluated, cost-effectiveness in its modern use is concerned
with estimation of costs and the evaluation of the worth or
effectiveness of systems. To these two considerations, we
may add a concern with time.
Cost, according to Webster, is "the amount paid or given
for anything hence whatever, as labor, self-denial . . .
etc., is requisite to secure a benefit." The important
point to keep in mind is that cost is one element of value
(or benefit) foregone in order to "secure" a greater
benefit. In short, cost is a negative benefit. Cost is not
limited to money, but rather it must include all benefits or
desired effects which may have to be sacrificed in order to
obtain greater benefits. It certainly includes money, time,
performance, consumption of scarce resources, and use of
available human skills. [Ref. 22 :p. 4]
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Effectiveness, in contrast, connotes the desirable
effects or benefits gained by reason of the expenditure or
incurring of a cost. In other words, costs are always
trade-offs for expected greater benefits. Effectiveness
also connotes some measure of performance or level of output
of the benefit-producing system. The benefit of an
engineering cost may be an airplane: the level of its
performance is the effectiveness. On the other hand the
word benefit may also be interpreted to mean not only the
generic description of the system but also its measurement.
I believe that benefit may be more descriptive than effec-
tiveness, but these words may mean the same thing in
relation to an economic evaluation. [Ref. 22 :p. 4]
In a military context, a CEA analysis might tackle such
questions as the extent to which aircraft should be repaired
at a depot rather than on the base; the possible character-
istics of a new strategic bomber and whether one should be
developed or not; and how much safety should be designed
into an aircraft or not. Each stage of analysis involves as
one stage a comparison of alternative courses of action in
terms of their costs and their effectiveness in attaining
some specific objective. This is cost-effectiveness
analysis, narrowly defined. Usually it consists of an
attempt to minimize dollar cost subject to some mission
requirement (which may not be measurable in dollar terms)
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or, conversely, to maximize some physical measure of output
subject to a budget constraint. [Ref. 23: p. 1]
To qualify as a complete analysis, a study must look at
the entire problem in its proper context. Characteristic-
ally, such an analysis should involve a systematic investi-
gation of the decision-maker's objectives and of the
relevant criteria: a comparison
—
quantitative where
possible—of the costs. Effectiveness, risks, and timing
associated with the alternative policies or strategies for
achieving each objective.
In defense planning, where there is no accepted
theoretical foundation, advice received from experts working
individually or as a committee is largely dependent on
subjective matter. The advice obtained from a cost-effec-
tiveness analysis should also. The virtue of analysis of
any kind is that it is able to make a more systematic and
efficient use of judgment than any of its alternatives. The
essence of the method is to construct and operate within a
"model"—an idealization of the situation appropriate to the
problem. Such a model may take many forms. Its purpose is
a means of communication, enabling participants in the study
to make their judgments in a concrete context. What is
important is feedback—the results from the model help the
decision-maker, analyst, and other experts on whom they
depend to revise their earlier judgments and thus to arrive
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at a clearer understanding of the problem and its context.
[Ref. 23:p. 3]
The central importance of the model can be seen most
readily by looking at its relation to the other elements of
analysis. There are five altogether. Each of them is
present in every analysis of choice, although they may not
always be explicitly identified. [Ref. 23:pp. 4,5]
1. The Objective (s)
Cost-effectiveness analysis is undertaken primarily
to help choose a policy or course of action. One of the
first and most important tasks of the analyst is to attempt
to discover what objectives the decision-maker is, or should
be. Trying to attain through this policy, and how to
measure the extent to which they are, in fact, attained.
This done, strategies, forces, or equipment are examined,
compared, and chosen on the basis of how well and how




The alternatives are the means by which it is hoped
the objectives can be attained. They need not be obvious
substitutes for one another or perform the same specific
function. Thus, to build the attack aircraft to perform one
mission or several different types of missions or whether to




The choice of a particular alternative for accom-
plishing the objective (s) implies that certain specific
resources can no longer be used for other purposes. These
are the costs. In analyses for a future time period, most
costs can be measured in money, but their true measure is in
terms of opportunities that they preclude. Thus, if we are
comparing ways to prevent mishaps from occurring, each of
the various ways has a cost attributed to it.
4. A Model ( s)
A model is a simplified representation of the real
world which abstracts the features of the situation relevant
to the question being studied. The means of representation
may vary from a set of mathematical equations or a computer
program to a purely verbal description of the situation, in
which judgment alone is used to predict the consequences of
various choices. In cost-effectiveness analysis (or any
analysis of choice) , the role of the model is to predict the
costs that each alternative would incur and the extent to
which each alternative would assist in attaining the
objectives.
5 A Criterion
A criterion is a rule or standard by which to rank
the alternatives in order of desirability and choose the
most promising. It provides a means of weighing costs
against effectiveness. [Ref. 23 :p. 5]
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Having formulated and researched the problem--that
is, clarified the issues, limited the extent of inquiry,
searched out the necessary data and relationships, and
identified the various elements—the process of analysis is
complete. Unfortunately, things are seldom so tidy:
alternatives are sometimes not adequate to attain the
objectives; the measures of effectiveness do not really
measure the extent to which the objectives are attained; the
predictions from the model are apt to be full of uncertain-
ties, and other criteria which look almost as attractive as
the one chosen, may lead to a different order of preference.
The key to the successful analysis is iteration—a continu-
ous cycle of formulating the problem, selecting the
objectives, collecting the data, building new models,
weighing the cost against performance, questioning assump-
tions and data, reexamining the objectives, opening new
alternatives, and so on until satisfaction is obtained or
time or money forces cut-off. [Ref. 23: p. 5]
In stating the purpose of cost-effectiveness
analysis, it is possible to see what it can and cannot do.
It can be applied to a range of problems extending from very
narrow to the very broad. Yet, every analysis has defects.
Some of these are limitations inherent in all analyses of
choice. Others are due to difficulties encountered in
coping with such things as the varying times at which
alternatives become available or uncertainty about the
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future. Still others are flaws or errors, which, hopefully,
will disappear as we learn to do better, more thorough, and
complete analyses. [Ref. 24 :p. 5]
C. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Benefit-cost analysis most recently can be traced to
Executive Order 12291, issued by President Reagan in 1981.
In short, this Executive order requires Federal agencies to
perform benefits assessments of proposed major regulations
and prohibits them from taking regulatory action unless
potential benefits exceed potential costs to society.
Although common-sense principles of benefit-cost
analysis have prevailed for centuries, the applications of
formal BCA techniques is a twentieth-century phenomenon. On
of the first applications occurred in 1902, when the River
and Harbor Act directed the Corps of Engineers to access the
costs and benefits of all river and harbor projects. More
widespread use occurred after the Flood Control Act of 1926,
which explicitly required that only projects whose benefits
exceeded their costs be submitted for congressional action.
(BCA book) Yet, the act itself gave no guidance on the
implementation of this criterion. Practice soon developed
on the basis of tradition and in which later became known as
the "Green Book." The "Green Book" never received official
status but was highly influential. Many of the ideas in the
book were incorporated in the U.S. Bureau of the Budget's
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Budget Circular A-47 which promulgated a set of guidelines
for all benefit-cost analyses of water resource projects.
The next important influence on the Concept of BCA took
shape during the 1950 's, as analysts of the Rand
Corporation, under contract to the U.S. Air Force, grappled
with the resource allocation problems facing the managers of
military spending programs. Although they advocated
techniques of systems analysis and cost-effectiveness
analysis rather than benefit-cost analysis, many of the core
ideas were closely related. An unclassified exposition of
the conceptual approach and analytical techniques developed
at Rand was provided in Charles J. Hitch and Roland N.
McKeans ' s The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age . This
book became known as "the Bible of the Pentagon" after newly
installed Defense Secretary Robert McNamara made Hitch an
Assistant Secretary of Defense and charged him with
implementation through out the Defense Department the
planning, budgetary, and analytical techniques developed at
Rand; BCA like other techniques are one important component
of the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) that was
put into place at the Pentagon in the early 1960 's. [Ref.
15:p. 18]
The 1960 's then witnessed a great expansion in the range
of spending programs to which BCA was applied. First there
were applications to other kinds of physical investment
projects such as transportation and urban renewal. These
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were soon followed by applications in such areas of social
spending as health, education, and income maintenance. A
major emphasis to this spreading of BCA was President
Lyndon Johnson's August 1965 decision to implement PPBS
,
based on that of the Defense Department, throughout the
civilian sector of the federal government. [Ref. 15 :p. 20]
The dramatic wave of "social regulation" enacted in the
late 1960 's and early 1970 's was followed by attempts to use
BCA to guide the growth of federal regulatory activity. BCA
began to be applied to economic, environmental, and health
and safety regulation in addition to public expenditure
projects. In response, new criticism and controversy
emerged. [Ref. 15: p. 20]
The nature of Executive Order 12291, issued by President
Ronald Reagan within a month of his inauguration, was
viewed, both by those who favored it and those who opposed
it, as part of the new administration's conservative
agendas. Few doubted that, to the extent it was actually
implemented, the effect would be to reduce social regulation
in the areas of health, safety, and consumer protection.
Liberal critics denounced BCA for its pro-business bias,
viewing it as one more tool for reducing the size and scope
of big government.
In 1965, during Johnson's reign, BCA was considered an
important part of the Federal government. BCA was then
viewed as a tool for guiding the expansion of government
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spending and for aiding government planning and management
of its economic activities. It was also perceived as a
liberal, "good management" measure that would reduce the
influence of special interests so that government programs
could be more effective in aiding those that they were
intended to aid. [Ref. 15:p. 20]
D. PROVISION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12291
The effects of Executive Order 12291 were threefold.
First, it expanded the definition of "major rule" and so
incorporated a greater number of regulations within its
purview. Second, it granted the 0MB authority to order that
a rule not designated major by an agency head may be so
designated. Third, it required that any set of related
rules be considered together as a major rule. [Ref. 24 :p.
2] Executive Order 12291 established the following analyti-
cal requirements for major rules:
1. Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate
information concerning the need for and consequences
of proposed government actions.
2. Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society from the regulation
outweigh the potential costs to society.
3. Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the
net benefits to society.
4. Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory
objective, the alternative involving the least net
cost to society shall be chosen.
5. Agencies are to set regulatory priorities with the aim
of maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society,
taking into account the condition of the particular
industries affected by regulations, the condition of
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national economy, and other regulatory actions
contemplated for the future [Section 2(a)-(e)].
To implement these analytic requirements, a new process
for conducting regulatory impact analysis (RIA) was
required. This process increases the time frame for
promulgating regulations and specifies that an RIA must




1. A description of the potential benefits of the rule,
including any beneficial effects that cannot be
quantified in monetary terms, and the identification
of those likely to receive the benefits:
2. A description of the potential costs of the rule,
including any adverse effects that cannot be
quantified in monetary terms, and the identification
of those likely to bear the costs;
3. A determination of the potential net benefits of the
rule, including an evaluation of effects that cannot
be quantified in monetary terms;
4. A description of alternative approaches that could
substantially achieve the same regulatory goal at
lower cost, together with an analysis of this
potential benefit and costs and a brief explanation of
the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed,
could not be adopted; and
5. Unless covered by the description required under
paragraph (4) of this subsection, an explanation of
any legal reasons why this rule cannot be based on the
requirements set forth in Section 2 of this Order.
This constitutes a considerable increase in the nature
and amount of substantiation an 0MB review requires to
sustain regulatory actions. [Ref. 24: p. 3] Moreover,
Section 4, "Regulatory Review," requires that before
approving any final rule, each agency shall [Section 4(a)-
(b)]:
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a. Make a determination that the regulation is clearly
within the authority delegated by law and consistent
with congressional intent, and include in the Federal
Register at the time of promulgation a memorandum of
law supporting that determination.
b. Make a determination that the factual conclusions upon
which the rule is based have substantial support in
the agency record, viewed as a whole, with full
attention to public comments in general and the
comments of persons directly affected by the rule in
particular.
With respect to (b) , weight must be given to general
public comments and then "special" weight must be given to
comments of persons directly affected by the rule. This
appears to require a balancing of the concerns of both those
incurring the costs and those receiving the benefits of the
proposed regulations. [Ref. 24 :p. 3]
Only three types of regulations are exempt from these
procedures: regulatory responses to an emergency situation;
regulations for which these procedures would conflict with
deadlines imposed by statue or judicial order; and such
others as directed by the President's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief (Section 8). [Ref. 24:p. 3]
Executive Order 12291 has several implications. Briefly
it now requires:
1. Increased time requirements for the proposal,
approval, and promulgation of regulations.
2. More rigorous demonstration of the benefits of the
proposed actions, to the extent of weighing benefits
against the societal cost.
3. Explicit analysis and selection of alternatives with
the lowest societal cost.
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4. More detailed and substantive analysis to support
rule-making.
In order to assist agencies in satisfying the
requirements of Section 2 of E.O. 12291, 0MB issued
regulatory impact analysis guidelines in 1981. These state
that RIA's should be written to enable independent reviewers
to make an informed judgement that the objectives of E.O.
12291 are satisfied. Specific guidelines for the
development of RIAs state that the following be provided
[Ref. 24:p. 4]:
1. Statement of need for and consequences of the proposed
regulatory action.
2. Examination of alternative approaches, including
consequences of having no regulation and alternatives
within the scope of the proposed action (e.g. , less
stringent permissible exposure levels, different
effective dates, and alternative means of compliance.)
3. Analysis of benefits and costs including estimates of
present value expressed in constant dollars using an
annual discount rate of 10 percent; specific type of
benefits, when received and by whom; and the type of
costs, when incurred and by whom.
4. Net benefit estimates including nonmonetary but
quantifiable benefits, nonquantifiable benefits and
costs, and cost effectiveness of various alternatives.
5. A rationale for choosing the proposed regulatory




The major implication of the 0MB guidelines is that RIAs
must not only explicitly consider nonregulatory alternatives
but must use risk and benefit assessments to link the market
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failure causing the problem to the proposed regulation.
[Ref. 25:p. 4]
E. DIFFICULTIES OF ASSESSING SAFETY
Benefits that are intuitively felt to be the most
important; i.e., health, safety, and the environment, are
also among the most difficult to measure. They are not
readily quantifiable (e.g. improved quality of life,
avoidable aircraft mishaps, enhanced quality of
surroundings) or even when units of benefits can be defined,
their value in terms of dollars or other standard measures
is a matter of subjective judgement. In cases of
quantifiable benefits, problems arise when a value is
attached not only to the benefit perceived by each
individual but also to an equitable distribution of the
benefit across a population as a whole. [Ref. 24 :p. 8]
The area of safety is specifically concerned with events
not only having a probability of occurrence but potentially
severe consequences. In conjunction with this, safety is
concerned with the adequacy of the safety precautions
surrounding such events. In the past, benefit-cost analysis
studies of safety focused on the avoidance of risk and the
identification of cost-effective risk-reduction measures.
[Ref. 24: p. 8] Examples of such risk reduction measures
pertaining to safety are:
1. Reduced chances of the release of hazardous material
and of the destruction of property.
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2. Reduced quantities of hazardous materials if and when
a release occurs.
3. Decreased numbers of mishaps involving fatality (ies)
or injury (ies)
.
4. Decreased numbers of expected fatalities or injuries.
5. Decreased property damage or production group of
people.
6. Better distribution of risk(s) across a particular
group of people.
7. Reduced insurance premiums or avoidance costs.
8. Reduced lawsuit claims.
The above list is not all inclusive or mutually
exclusive, but shows the problem of selecting safety benefit
measures without overlapping.
Difficulties encountered in safety-related benefit-
assessment include the fact that large, complex projects
(i.e., a complex aircraft weapon system development) may not
offer benefits to the same people who are at risk. Other
difficulties include: 1) how to assess the difference
between a low probability incident having catastrophic
consequences i.e., loss of life, and a high probability
incident having marginal consequences, i.e., minor injury
and 2) determining the probability of multiple
fatality/mishaps/ injuries versus a single-
fatality/mishap/ injury event.
Then there is the problem of not only measuring but
determining what the "avoided cost " benefits are. Avoided
costs may be strictly economic (i.e., the losses of net
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output of goods and services due to property damage,
personal injury and death [Ref. 25:p. 107]), or abstract
(i.e., avoided pain from injury, increased operational
effectiveness) . Direct economic benefits could include
avoided engineering aircraft change proposals, avoided
aircraft mishap costs, avoided pilot losses, and indirect
economic benefits would include avoided loss of output to
the economy (foregone earnings) resulting from death or
disability.
In conjunction with these economic benefits would be
economic costs due to lower attrition rates resulting in
increased pilot retention rates and numbers of aircraft to
maintain.
Since economic benefits/costs (direct and indirect) are
relatively more concrete compared to the losses received by
the victims, i.e., in this case the military services or
their families. There is a tendency to use economic costs
in making management decisions. A correct interpretation of
economic costs is that they are the lower bound costs
society would spend to prevent accidents.
Noneconomic losses aren't usually taken into
consideration but probably should be, in many cases. These
losses have two parts: 1) pain, fear, and suffering of the
victims involved, and 2) loss of consumption on the part of
the victim and family. There is little dispute that these
losses should be added to the economic losses described
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above, the problem is difficult to see how to quantify them
in a way that will fit into a social accounting system
necessary for evaluating different projects. [Ref. 25:p.
107]
Benefit-cost analysis studies are now being performed
much more routinely as an integral part of safety studies,
but there is no agreed-upon methodology for identifying or
quantifying benefits. More over, the use of the results of
such benefit analyses varies widely. The level of risk
which is deemed acceptable is either not known
quantitatively or varies depending on the decision maker or
regulatory body. Hence, the overall reduction in risk which
must or should be achieved in fairly arbitrary. [Ref. 24 :p.
9]
A first step in estimating the benefits of a safety
regulation is to estimate the reduction or avoidance of
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities that the standard will
produce. Safety outcomes may be estimated from data on
injury rates, aircraft mishaps, and their causes with
judgmental consideration given to the effect the safety
regulation has in avoiding or reducing injuries, mishaps,
and their causes.
Other problems associated with a benefit-cost safety
analysis include difficulties in identifying the full range
of not only benefits but costs (including those accruing to
other than the sponsor and intended beneficiaries.
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differentiating benefits from costs, choosing an appropriate
discount rate (if required) for comparing costs and benefits
overtime, selecting the appropriate criterion for comparing
benefits (i.e., net present value or benefit-cost
difference); and handling multi-attribute outcomes. [Ref.
24:pp. 11-12]
Even though difficult problems exist in performing a
safety assessment, economists and others feel the concept
provides a useful framework for thinking about a proposed
action or comparing alternatives even if its not possible to
do it in a wholly quantifiable way. However, without better
resolution of these methodological problems, decision makers
or proponents of the action may have a tendency to assign
unduly high values to those benefits which are important but
hard to measure, while opponents may tend to over emphasize
the fact that the benefits which are easiest to quantify and
value are relatively small. [Ref. 24 :p. 12]
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V. METHODOLOGY
The first section of this chapter provides an oveirview
of System Engineering and System Engineering Specialties.
System Engineering and management techniques help to ensure
that cost, schedule, and technical performance (CSTP)
objectives are met when developing a weapon system. System
safety is identified as a system engineering specialty and
is considered a prerequisite to obtaining CSTP objectives.
The second section provides a standardized approach to
use when performing a system engineering cost-effectiveness
evaluation. The approach has 10 steps. Each step is
reviewed briefly.
The third section defines what "system effectiveness" is
and provides an overview of a multi-attribute model which
may be used to evaluate a system's effectiveness. System
safety isn't considered a major program objective in the
multi-attribute model—but could be if it was identified as
such. In conclusion, system effectiveness models could be
considered as one possible way of determining the cost-
effectiveness of system safety.
A. SYSTEM ENGINEERING/ENGINEERING SPECIALTIES
There has been an emerging awareness of the need for and
the importance of total system design. System engineering
is fundamentally concerned with deriving a coherent total
system design to achieve stated objectives. No two sys-
tems are ever alike in their developmental requirements.
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However, there is a uniform identifiable process for
logically arriving at system decisions regardless of
system purpose, size, and complexity.
Systems Engineering Managerial Procedures
AFSCM 375-5
The past several decades have seen the rise of large,
highly interactive systems that are on the forward edge of
technology. This is especially true in DOD where their
motivation is the basic security of the Nation. These
technical systems have a natural process of evolution, or
life cycle, in which actions taken (or not taken) in the
very early stages can mean the difference between success
and failure. [Ref. 26:p. 1-i]
The purpose of System Engineering is to prevent these
failures through a unified approach that completely defines
all requirements on the system and establishes a system
configuration which is proven early-on to be capable of
meeting certain requirements. System engineering is often
referred to as a "frontend" process. That is, the majority
of System Engineering tasks are completed in the initial
phase of a program, when about 5 percent of a program's
funding is expended. This initial effort results in
defining the configuration and size of the system and its
logistic support. The resulting program commitment of funds
typically represents 90 percent of program life cycle costs.
Accuracy and completeness of the early System Engineering
effort is therefore essential in maintaining a program
within budget constraints. [Ref. 26 :p. 1-i]
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While the definitions of system and system engineering
depend somewhat on the application and are nearly as
numerous as the practioners. A statement made concerning
system engineering several years ago:
. . . for more than a decade, engineers and administrators
have witnessed the emergence of a broadening approach to
the problem of designing equipment. This phenomenon has
been poorly understood and loosely described. It has been
called system design, system analysis, and often the
systems approach. [Ref. 22 :p. 27]
In the ensuing years since this statement was made, there
have been numerous efforts to describe system engineering,
both in an abstract sense, and as a methodological
disclipine. A definition applicable to DOD programs is:
System Engineering is the application of scientific and
engineering efforts to (a) transform an operational need
into a description of system performance parameters and a
system configuration through the use of an interactive
process of definition, synthesis, analysis, design, test,
evaluation; (b) integrate related technical parameters
and ensure compatibility of all physical, functional, and
program interfaces in a manner that optimizes the total
system definition and design, (c) integrate reliability,
maintainability, safety, survivability, human, and such
factors into the total engineering effort to meet cost,
schedule, and technical performance objectives. [Ref.
26:p. 1-1]
An examination of the preceding definition of system
engineering reveals the following key words and their
implications:
WORD IMPLICATION




3 Systems or devices Outputs
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4. Process Transformation (synthesis)
5. Optimally convewrted Criterion of worth,
constraints, analysis,
evaluation, optimization,
6. Decision Making Choice (evaluation)
7. Iteractive Feedback (optimization)
Essentially system engineering is a feedback control
system for transforming a set of inputs in an optimal manner
within certain allowable constraints to meet stated needs in
accordance with a defined measure of worth. [Ref. 22 :p.
28]
Over the past several decades, as complex systems have
evolved and matured, the problems encountered in the
"management" of these systems have caused DOD to develop a
systematic engineering management process that directs
periodic review and control of a program throughout its
acquisition and operational life.
In 1976, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-109 was published. The philosophy behind OMB
Circular A-109 is for the Government to become a more
reliable customer by standardizing its acquisition policies
throughout the Government in order to avoid major contract
delays and cancellations, and to promote an unbiased concept
definition. It requires that the Government operating
agency establish and justify a valid requirement for
capability, which must be approved by the executive agency
head (Secretary of Defense, NASA Agency, etc.) before
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involving industry in the system acquisition process. The
approval of this needed capability also established the
priority and theoretically the availability of resources to
fulfill the need.
In March 1982, DODINST 5000.1, Major Systems Acquisi-
tion, was revised to reflect the following acquisition
management principles:
• Ensure effective design and price competition
• Improve system readiness and subtainability
• Increase the stability in acquisition programs through
effective long-range planning, use of evolutionary
alternatives instead of solutions at the frontier of
technology, realistic budgeting and funding programs for
the total life cycle, and planning to achieve economical
production rates
• Delegate authority to the lowest levels of the service
that can provide a comprehensive review of the program
• Achieve a cost-effective balance between acquisition
costs, ownership costs, and system effectiveness in
terms of the missions to be performed.
In conjunction with DOD 5000.1, System Engineering
identifies and defines the functional characteristics of
system hardware, software, facilities, and personnel through
an interactive process of analysis and design, with the
objective of satisfying an operational mission need in the
most cost effective manner. The System Engineering process
analyzes mission requirements and translates them into
design requirements at succeeding lower levels to insure
operational satisfaction. Control of the evolving
development process is maintained by System Engineering
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through a continuing series of reviews and audits of
technical documentation produced by supporting
organizations. [Ref. 26:p. 1-11]
The output of System Engineering is documentation. This
is the means by which it controls the evolutionary develop-
ment of the system. During the Demonstration/Validation
phase, System Engineering prepares a number of plans that
define how the Full Scale Development phase will be
conducted and cover primarily the engineering speciality
areas. These plans are usually submitted with the FSD
proposal in draft form. Final plans are a part of the FSD
phase Contractor Data Requiremetns List, submitted usually
within several months after contract go-ahead, except for
those areas closely associated with deployment and
operations. They are used by Government organizations to
ensure compliance with standard policies and procedures in
these areas, and by contractor personnel to develop detailed
schedules and to plan allocation of resources. Specifica-
tions prepared by System Engineering form the basis for the
design and development effort. The top level specification
(system, segment, or configuration item) is incorporated in
the FSD Statement of Work and becomes the Government's docu-
ment. Requirements are flowed down and allocated to lower
level specifications, which designers and subcontractors
translate into hardware and software. As the system
development progresses, System Engineering documents status
82
in the form of design review packages, test performance
measurement reports, analysis and simulation reports, and
other documentation, which provides the Government with a
continuing assessment of the capability to meet performance
requirements. [Ref. 26:p. 1-12]
This documentation may include:
• System Engineering Management Plan
• System, segment, prime item, and computer program
configuration items specifications
• Interface Control Documents
• Risk Analysis Management Plan
• Survivability/Hardness Plan
• System Design Review data packages
• Mission analysis reports




• Safety/Hazard Analysis Plan
• Human Engineering Plan
• Integrated Logistics Support Plan
• Electromagnetic (EM) Compatibility and EM Interference
Control Plan
• Parts, Materials, and Processes Control Plan
• System Test Plan
• Mission Support Plan
• Audit reports.
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Engineering specialities are integrated into the
development through the System Engineering process.
Engineering specialties are those disciplines which support
the design process by applying knowledge from a specific
area to ensure system operability in its operational
environment. Engineering Specialties include reliability,
maintainability, human engineering, transportability, system
safety, electromagnetic compatibility, parts/materials and
processes and other specialist areas involved in development
of a general class (ships, aircraft, tanks) of a system.
Specialty engineers draw upon an extensive background of
data extracted from past and current programs to develop
standards, guidelines, and checklists to support and
evaluate the development of new designs. [Ref. 26:p. 15-1]
The role of the specialist under System Engineering is
to define requirements for design and verification, to audit
the resulting design for compliance, and to plan all
activities related to their functions.
B. 10 STEP SYSTEM ENGINEERING COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
APPROACH
The objective of system engineering is to maximize some
parameter of a system's worth in terms of effectiveness or
performance by means of a design. A system's worth is
basically a function of the differences between its benefits
and its costs. However, absolute differences of themselves
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provide no true criterion of worth. They must be related in
some way to a scale of particular value.
For example, a dollar profit is usually evaluated as a
percentage gain on an amount invested. A gain in speed is
meaningful as a percentage increase over some reference
value of speed. A 5-mph increase might be considerable for
a 50-mph tractor but inconsequential for a jet airplane.
[Ref. 22:p. 5]
A particular engineering activity or decision may result
in a gain in benefit over cost for one component of the
value at the expense of a loss for some other. Thus a
trade-off situation exists. In order to conclude the worth
of the one value in terms of the other, there must be a
value scale for relating them. [Ref. 22 :p. 5]
In the most general sense then the objective is to
maximize system worth or "utility."-^ Thus:
Maximize p = f (X2,X2 ,X3 , . . . ,X(3. . .x)
where (x^) are the value variables. Some are positive
(benefits) ; others are negative (costs)
.
It should be emphasized that this is not a restricted
meaning of cost-effectiveness. When the term "cost-effec-
tiveness" is popularly used it is often implied that costs
^Utility means usefulness, the satisfying of a need. A
decision or an outcome has high utility when it satisfies a
need as well as it can with the available resources.
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are dollars and effectiveness is system effectiveness in an
operational sense. System worth may be conveniently
subdivided into three major components:
1. System performance (performance effectiveness).
2. Time (time effectiveness).
3. Money (monetary effectiveness) as a common measure of
resources.
Practice may often be restricted to the conditional
requirement of the following:
1. Given a required performance and schedule, minimize
dollar cost as weighted by time.
2. Given a time weighted cost, maximize performance.
These are extremes; the optimum system that maximized
system worth will usually fall between them.
A system is time-limited. It takes time to realize the
need. It takes time to develop a system to satisfy it.
Finally, the system operates to satisfy it. The entire time
span or system life cycle must be considered in relation to
the system effectiveness. Time is one of the costs. In
actuality, the realization of the time relationship leads
automatically to the need for considering cost over the
system life cycle. Time may be valued in money. The values
are threefold.
1. The worth of time ot make decisions (flexibility)
;
2. The worth of time for schedule of output. (This may





The worth of time for waiting for a promised future
system value to materialize.
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System Engineering is concerned with the design of a new
system which is expected to produce a desired result over
time. Thus, system engineering techniques must predict the
future, but the future is uncertain. This uncertainty must
not only be accepted but must also be taken into account in
the design. Therefore, an appreciation for the basic
elements of probability must exist.
All decision problems contain the following elements.
1. A set of alternative actions the decision maker might
select;
2. A set of conditions which reflect the possible
environment in which the decision is to be made, often
called states of nature or states of the world;
3. A set of outcomes which may result, depending upon
which action is chosen and which of the environmental
conditions do in fact exist at the time the action is
taken;
4. A value or utility to the decision maker resulting
from the outcome
;
5. Some assessment of the likelihood or probability of
each of the states of nature being the true one when
the action is taken.
In evaluating the cost-effectiveness of advanced systems
the following prerequisites must be recognized.
1. Common goals, purpose, or mission of the systems must
be identified and at least theoretically attainable.
2. Alternative means of meeting the goals must exist.
3. Constraints for bounding the problem must be
discernible.
Without common goals, the evaluation is meaningless, for
example, comparison of an airplane with a computer would be
nonsensical. If there is only one feasible system for
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achieving the goal, there is no latitude for comparative
evaluation. By recognizing and specifying constraints, one
bounds the evaluation and the preferred systems within these
constraints can then be identified. [Ref. 27 :p. 114]
It should be recognized that the preferred systems are
such for only the specified goals and constraints. By
subtle alteration of the goals and constraints, different
systems frequently can be made to look best.
A serious problem in cost-effectiveness terminology
frequently arises when reference is made to the require-
ments associated with the goals of missions to be fulfilled
by the systems. To give the goals tangible meaning, their
requirements must be specified. These requiremetns will be
referred to below as "mission requirements."
Mission requirements are those attributes that must be
met in evaluation of systems to fulfill their goals.
Unfortunately, the term "system requirements" is frequently
used for these attributes, which results in semantic
ambiguity because it is never clear whether the requirements
are imposed on or by the system. Hence, "mission require-
ments" will refer to those elements of the goals that must
be met by the system capabilities. Evaluation criteria
constitute measures by which the suitability of the
candidate systems to fulfill the desired goals is judged or
evaluated. The aim of the cost-effectiveness evaluation is
to identify the system whose capabilities meet the mission
88
requirements in the most advantageous manner. [Ref. 27 :p.
115]
The following 10 steps constitute the standardized
approach to conducting a cost-effectiveness evaluation on
advanced systems. Although the steps are presented in the
order in which they would generally be performed, changes in
the sequence are sometimes desirable, depending on the
idiosyncrasies of the evaluation.
1. Define the desired goals, objectives, missions, or
purposes that the systems are to meet or fulfill.
2. Identify the mission requirements essential for the
attainment of the desired goals.
3. Develop alternative system concepts for accomplishing
the missions.
4. Establish system evaluation criteria (measures) that
relate system capabilities to the mission
requirements
.
5. Select a fixed-cost or fixed-effectiveness approach.
6. Determine capabilities of the alternative systems in
terms of criteria evaluation.
7. Generate systems-versus-criteria array.
8. Analyze merits of alternative systems.
9. Perform sensitivity analysis.
10. Document the rationale, assumptions, and analyses
underlying the previous nine steps. [Ref. 27 :p. 116]
1. Step 1; Define the Desired Goals
A key characteristic of those analyses that fall
within the term "cost-effectiveness evaluations" is that the
goal or goals can be met by a single system (or program) .
The purpose of the cost-effectiveness evaluation is to
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identify the "best" system for attaining the specified
goals. For example, a governmental agency might conduct an
evaluation to determine the most desirable smog control
device for automobiles. Similarly, the agency might also
want to evaluate the comparative merits of expending funds
on air pollution versus stream pollution. However, in this
latter type of decision, a new element has been introduced
—
both of the goals are desirable and they cannot be fulfilled
by a single system. This charactgeristic transfers the
analysis and evaluation associated with arrivnig at the
"best" decision, from cost-effectiveness per se to resoruce
allocation. What is really desired is not the best system
for meeting the goals but rather the best allocation of
available resoruces among the alternative opportunities.
Conducting a cost-effectiveness evaluation to determine the
best smog control device for automobiles may be a perfectly
valid and legitimate application of that technique.
However, if the decision required is really how best to
expend funds for the elimination or reduction of air
pollution (which cannot be accomplished by any one
"system") , the solution falls into the domain of resource
allocation. The resource allocation decision should incor-
porate assessment of such actions as subsidizing the
manufacture of electric-powered automobiles by elimination
of the excise tax, the policing of soruces of pollution
(refineries, primary metals industries, and so on) , in
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addition to any other controllable activities that have an
impact on the problem. [Ref. 27 :p. 116]
To perform a meaningful evaluation of alternative
systems it is necessary first to establish the specific
goals or missions that the systems are to fulfill. Without
such an identification of goals there is no framework for
structuring the subsequent evaluations. Usually the goals
are identified at least in a general manner by the
requesters of the evaluation. The level of generality with
which the goals are specified and the inherent optimism
implicit in the goals constitute two problem areas in goal
definition. If goals are specified in too general terms
(motherhood and country; i.e., eliminating poverty,
destroying the enemy) the constraints established by the
analyst for bounding the evaluation are the product of his
imagination and interpretation of the goals rather than the
product of the goals per se. On the other hand, care must
be taken not to make mission goals too specific or they
limit the scope of possible candidate systems by implicitly
defining system concepts rather than just the desired goals.
A potential danger always exists in that the goal
setter may specify a goal that is unattainable by means of
current (or reasonably advanced) technology. Most new
systems contain a significant element of research and
development. The problem is how to make the fine
91
distinction between attainable and unattainable advances in
technology.
Care must be exercised not to identify the goals in
such a manner as to bias the evaluation by including
requirements of such a specific nature that they exclude
from consideration potential candidate systems. The point
here is that, while specific goals need to be identified,
care should be taken to avoid including extraneous goals or
system-biasing methods of attaining the goals.
2 . Step 2: Identify Mission Requirements
One of the basic purposes of defining unambiguously
the specific goals or mission is the facilitation of the
identification of mission requirements whose fulfillment is
essential to the attainment of the goals or missions. The
mission requirements should be identified as parametrically
as possible so as to reduce the possibility of biasing the
evaluation. For example, in a comparison of military
transportation systems, one system may be capable of
delivering many men but relatively little supporting
materiel, while another system may be capable of delivering
large quantities of materiel but relatively few men. By
specifying a number of men and/or materiel as a fixed
requirement, one may unnecessarily bias the subsequent
evaluation. This bias could possibly be eliminated by the
establishment of a relationship that converts man and
materiel into fighting man-days. The expression of the
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mission requirements in this manner could portray in a more
meaningful manner what is really desired. [Ref. 27 :p. 119]
The identification of mission requirements that are
pertinent derivatives of the goals to be fulfilled usually
requires judgment sharpened by experience. Errors of
commission are just as deceiving as errors of omission, in
that if mission characteristics that are not necessarily
essential to the successful fulfillment of the mission are
identified as requirements, they can strongly prejudice the
subsequent evaluation. Instances have occurred in which so
many mission requirements were identified in such a specific
manner that (unknowingly) it was physically impossible to
accomplish the mission with any system. The "let's be safe
and include everything" approach is not a substitute for
judgment and experience. On the other hand, it is obvious
that the omission of significant mission requirements could
readily result in an invalid conclusion. Somewhere between
the too-many mission requirements and the too-few mission
requirements is the elusive "just right." [Ref. 27: p. 119]
3 . Step 3 : Develop Alternative Systems
Once the mission requirements have been identified,
the next step is to develop alternative system concepts that
can meet (or exceed) them. If only one system can be con-
ceived, any further implementation of a cost-effectiveness
evaluation for purposes of system selection is futile. To
conduct a meaningful evaluation, at least two distinct
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candidate systems must be conceived. The alternative
systems should be dissimilar if the evaluation is to be
conducted on the system level. For example, if the key
difference between candidate systems is basically one major
subsystem, the evaluation should be reduced in scope and
focused on the subystem (if the effects of all other system
characteristics are common to both systems and thus cancel
out) . [Ref . 27:p. 120]
In attempting to implement this step the practition-
er quickly encounters a serious problem: the depth of
detail associated with system definition. Since the purpose
of the evaluation is usually to aid in deciding which of
alternative systems should be developed, specific details of
the systems are generally lacking. Too little system
definition usually results in a large variance in system
effectiveness and cost. On the other hand, to require that
the candidate systems be designed in detail before being
evaluated would defeat the basic purpose and value of cost-
effectiveness and negate the major benefits accruing from
the cost-effectiveness evaluation. A basic guide to the
appropriate depth of detail in system synthesis is that it
be conducted to that depth that lends confidence to the
ansers. [Ref. 27:p. 121]
4 . Step 4: Establish System Evaluation Criteria
Numerous papers discussing cost-effectiveness have
been written during the past several years. Unfortunately,
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many of them create only confusion rather than clarification
by presenting discussion of cost and effectiveness within
different, and sometimes unique, semantic frameworks. Gen-
eral discussions of the philosophical aspects of cost-
effectiveness are usually conducted on a high level of
abstraction. However, meaningful evaluations cannot be con-
ducted on these lofty levels because of the very lack of de-
tailed specificity inherent in the general terms that makes
their use so attractive for philosophical discussion. [Ref.
27: p. 123] Four indenture levels of terminology associated
with cost-effectiveness evaluations are shown in Figure 5-1.
Under Program cost, the third indenture level (1, 2,
3, 4) could be divided readily into at least two additional
levels. The semantic problems generally do not stem from
the cost side of the evaluation, but rather from the effec-
tiveness side. Under Effectiveness, A through G indicate
typical terms that are often used to imply the concept of
effectiveness. Utility tends to be favored by economists.
Productivity tends to be favored by persons who are inclined
to focus attention on the results to be derived from the
systems being evaluated. Worth tends to be favored by en-
gineers. Merit or figure-of-merit is a carry-over from
operations research, where one of the key steps in solving
an operational problem is to identify an appropriate figure-
of-merit. Where the solutions (systems) need to satisfy a
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1. Performance 17. Information received
2. Lethality 18. Security
3. Economy 19. Survivability
4. Safety 20. Vulnerability
5. Mobility 21. Penetrability
6. Accuracy 22. Repairability
7. Maneuverabil ity 23. Dependability
8. Availability 24. Capability
9. Flexibility 25. Abortability
10. Prestige 26. Technical confidence
11. Damage to target 27. Scientific informa-
12. Maintainability tion yield
13. Reliability 28. Mission versatility
14. Probability of mission 29. Value of targets
success destroyed
15. Evolutionary development 30. Spillover effects
16. Growth potential 31. Technical
desirability
Figure 5.1 A Standardized Approach to Cost-
Effectiveness Evaluations
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a. Weight capability J- Productive scientific
b. Reaction time man-hr
c. Reliability k. Prob. of target
d. Range destruction
e. Speed 1. Ton-miles/hr
f
.
CEP m. U.S. lives lost
g. Deg/sec turn n. Cost to enemey to
h. Init. oper. cap. counter






number of criteria, as is often the case in cost-effective-
ness evaluations, thebasing of the evaluation on a sole
figure-of-merit is generally inadequate. [Ref. 27 :p. 123]
Benefit is favored by the Bureau of the Budget.
Gain is favored by some economists while value received is
one other way of viewing effectiveness.
The third indenture level (1 through 31) contains
terms that possess greater specificity than the second
indenture level (A through G) . However, this specificit is
deceptive.
Reliability is considerd to be a very specific,
quantitative attribute. However, in evaluation of systems,
all system attributes must undergo a penetrating analysis to
ascertain exactly what is meant, implied, or measured by
that attribute. Reliability is often defined as "the
probability that a device will perform without failure of a
specific function under given conditions for a given period
of time." To use this term to describe quantitatively some
attribute of a complex weapon system or space system (as is
often done) raises serious problems of interpretation.
Precisely what is jmeant by asserting that a manned
spacecraft system has 0.93 reliability? Generally, it is
interpreted to mean that 93 times out of 100 the system will
perform as planned. Does it mean that no bulb will burn
out, no valve will stock, no toggle switch will fail, and so
on, on 93 of the 100 missions? If it means that subsystems
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essential to the performance of the mission will not fail on
93 of the 100 missions, how is the determination of what
constitutes an "essential subsystem" made? Many subsystems
are highly desirable and hence are incorporated into the
spacecraft, but does this make them essential? For example,
if the food-warming system failed, should that mission then
be counted as one of the 7 out of 100 anticipated failures?
The point being made is that reliability figures, when
applied to complex, manned systems, rather than conveying a
hard, quantitative measure of a very specific attribute,
upon close analysis are found to be generally meaningless.
[Ref. 27:p. 124]
Safety is one of the most difficult criteria to
identify and evaluate. Western society tends to place an
almost infinite value on human life. Of course, space
missions would never be undertaken if some risk (in the
nonmathematical sense) were not acceptable. Past attempts
to relate this risk (or value of human life) to dollars have
not proven successful. Yet even a cursory analysis can
yield interesting conclusions: almost every individual
considers something more dear than life. Newspapers often
make mention of individual sacrifices that likewise
illustrate the rational acceptance of a substantial risk of
life. Fortunately, the need for physical demonstrations of
this willingness to risk one's life are relatively rare.
However, the high cost of rescue on space missions, for
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example, necessitates a critical examination of the attri-
butes and possible alternative views of safety. It is
recognized that the risk of death accompanies many accepted
human activities and that these risks are realized and
accepted. (For example, the risk associated with air travel
is accepted for the greater convenience of air travel.) It
might be productive to consider safety in terms of risk and
reward. For example, rather than establish a very high
degree of safety (like 0.9999) as a space mission
constraint, or require a space rescue capability with its
associated high cost and uncertainty of success (that is,
can rescue be accomplished in time?) would not a preferable
alternative be to specify a mission crew safety of 0.99,
with the understanding that in lieu of greater safety or
development of a space rescue capability, the astronauts
would receive a $100,000 (or even a $1,000,000) bonud, or
some figure commensurate with the risks involved for under-
taking the mission. In many professions today, the pay
scale is commensurate with the training, skill, and risk
involved (deep-sea divers, test pilots, and so on) . By
developing an acceptable variation to what could otherwise
be a constraint, systems that would otherwise not be
feasible (for example, if greater safety were required) can
become candidates for consideration. Penetrating analyses
are frequently required to arrive at an understanding of the
essential concepts inherent in terms such as safety.
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prestige, technical desirability, and so on. [Ref. 27 :p.
125]
The previous comments are important for analyzing
the cost-effectiveness of system safety. For system safety,
the question is: "How much system safety should be required
in the development of advanced weapon systems (i.e., naval
aircraft) ?"
Although they are not uniquely expressible in a
quantitative manner, some of the third-level criteria are
significant to most evaluations. They should not be ignored
or falsely quantified. Instead, the candidate systems
should be verbally evaluated in terms of these criteria by
discussion of the relative capabilities of the systems to
satisfy those criteria that are pertinent. [Ref. 27 :p. 125]
The fourth indenture level (a, b, c, d, and so on)
lists typical quantifiable criteria used for evaluating
alternative systems. In almost all evaluations, some
significant criteria are quantifiable. Evaluations should
always be based on and expressed in terms of the most
specific (not necessarily detailed) criteria that are
meaningful. [Ref. 27 :p. 125]
The selection of appropriate and adequate criteria
is based on judgment augmented by experience. The omission
of significant criteria could readily invalidate the results
of an evaluation. Thus, rather than simplifying the evalua-
tion, the inclusion of criteria with low levels of
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pertinence unnecessarily complicates the evaluation and its
subsequent implementation. [Ref. 27 :p. 126]
A simple test of the adequacy or completeness of
criteria for evaluation is to question whether one system
could excel in most of the criteria generated and still not
be deemed "best." If the answer is affirmative, important
criteria are missing. By their very nature, military
systems generally require consideration of aspects of
vulnerability, reaction time, and detectability in their
evaluation. Considerable insight into the subtleties of the
goals and mission requirements is usually necessary for the
generation of other meaningful evaluation criteria.
5 . Step 5; Select Fixed Cost or Fixed Effectiveness
Approach
The choice between fixed cost and fixed effective-
ness is necessary in virtually all cost-effectiveness
analyses and is, in general, a nontrivial decision. In the
fixed-cost approach, the basis for selection between
alternatives is the amount of effectiveness obtained for a
given expenditure of resources. On the other hand, in the
fixed-effectiveness approach, the selection criterion is the
amount of cost incurred or resources required to obtain a
given level of effectiveness. If there is only one well-
defined measure of cost to which the resources required may
be directly related and only one pertinent criterion of
effectiveness, such as targets destroyed, orbital payload
delivered, and so on, there will not be any significant
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difference between the results obtained by these approaches,
since the fixed-cost and fixed-effectiveness approaches will
merely be mirror images of each other. In such cases, the
choice of approach will not affect the results of the
analysis within given economic and effectiveness boundary
conditions. [Ref. 27:p. 127]
a. Fixed-Cost Approach
A basic step in the fixed-cost approach is the
identification of the candidate systems that are competitive
for the given resources. Then the number of units of each
system that can be developed, procured, and operationally
implemented with the fixed resources is determined.
Finally, the degree to which each alternative satisfies the
goals or mission requirements is estimated, and that system
which fulfills the goals to the greatest extent is judged to
be best. [Ref. 27:p. 128]
b. Fixed-Effectiveness Approach
In the fixed-effectiveness approach, the
procedure discussed above is reversed, with the desired
level of effectiveness specified by way of the mission
requirements. The alternative systems taht can fulfill
these requirements are evaluated competitively with the
evaluation being based on the total penalties or costs
incurred by each alternative. [Ref. 27: p. 128]
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6.
Step 6; Determine Capabilities of Alternative
Systems
Once the appropriate criteria have been identified,
the next step is to express the abilities of the candidate
system in terms of the criteria, quantitatively if possible,
qualitatively if not. [Ref. 27:p. 129]
7 Step 7; Generate System versus Criteria Array
Two different techniques of conducting cost-effec-
tiveness evaluations within the fixed-cost or fixed-effec-
tiveness approaches are often encountered: (a) the model
approach, and (b) the tabular display approach. The model
approach, in which a cost or effectiveness model is
generated, is usually used when the basic differences
between the candidate systems are relatively minor, so as to
permit the valid expression of their essential differences
by a single parameter. [Ref. 27:p. 129]
a. Model Approach
The use of mathematical effectiveness models is
warranted only when the systems being evaluated are
basically so similar that those evaluation criteria that
cannot be readily qualified or interrelated cancel out, thsu
leaving only quantifiable and commensurable criteria.
Mathematical cost models are much more frequently
encountered. While exhibiting significant advantages for
specific applications, they also possess substantial limita-
tions. The key advantage of the use of mathematical cost
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models is the rapidity with which a number of systems can be
costed. [Ref. 27:p. 129]
b. Tabular Display Approach
The tabular display approach is used when the
systems are being evaluated on the basis of either quantifi-
able criteria that are incommensurable, or by both quantifi-
able and unquantifiable criteria. In this approach the
criteria underlying the evaluation are identified at the
tops of columns and arranged in decreasing importance of
criteria, from left to right (see Figure 5.2). The alterna-
tive systems are then listed vertically, with the alterna-
tive that meets the firt (most significant) criterion to the
greatest extent listed first, and so on. This approach is
particularly useful when many alternative systems are being
evaluated because it can be used to eliminate the less
likely candidates and focus attention on the two or three
major contenders. The ultimate selection is then generally
based on a judicial evaluation of system capabilities and
mission requirements. [Ref. 27 :p. 133]
8 . Step 8: Analyze Merits of Alternative Systems
Once the candidate systems are arranged in order of
their capability of satisfying the most important criterion
or criteria, it is generally possible to eliminate the
poorer candidates and focus attention on the top three or
four candidates. If the effectiveness criteria and cost

























































































































superior to the respective values for the other candidates,
that system is dominant and the selection is obvious. If
the criteria values for the top two contenders are virtually
identical, and no significant difference in costs exists,
the appropriate answer may be that, based on current
knowledge and assumptions made, there is no significant
difference between the top two contenders, in which case the
adoption of parallel study or development efforts may be
indicated in order to identify the superior system. If the
system costs differ significantly and preferences shift
among the criteria, which also differ significantly, the
selection will need to be made on the basis of value
judgments. [Ref. 27:p. 135]
The merit of this approach is that it clearly
presents the basis on which the selection was made. The
selection may be vetoed by higher levels of decision-makers
who may incorporate high-level criteria into their
evaluation, but the basis on which the initial system
selection was made is apparent.
An argument sometimes presented against any approach
based largely on the verbal presentations of value judgments
is that it is highly subjective. In reality, value
judgments usually portray the realities of the situation
much more accurately than does the use of numerical values
alone. The use of numbers requires the expression of multi-
faceted relationships by discrete integers; for example, the
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payload capability of candidate systems may be 2000, 3000,
and 4000 pounds, respectively. If the minimum acceptable
payload is 2000 pounds, the normalized ratios would be 1,
1.5, and 2. (How tempting to combine with other normalized
criteria!) But what is the significance of a capability to
carry 1000 or 2 000 pounds more than that required? The
importance of this excess payload capability to the attain-
ment of the mission goals may be substantial or it may be
insignificant. If it is recognized that the function of the
analyst is to communicate to the decision-maker the resutls
of his knowledge, experience, and judgment with respect to
the particular evaluation at hand, the sole use of numbers
(either the original number or ratios) for even quantifiable
criteria, much less for unquantifiable criteria, is a coldly
sterile approach. In reality it is almost insulting because
of the implicit assumption of "rightness" inherent in the
use of numbers. By the use of verbal portrayal (in addition
to the use of numerical values for quantifiable criteria)
,
the multifaceted interrelationships between systems and
criteria, which are multidimensional impressions based on
the knowledge, experience, and judgment of the analyst, can
be more readily conveyed to the decision-maker. The proba-
bility of successfully communicating the impact of the real-
world multidimensional interrelationships between systems,
criteria, and goals is much higher by the verbal expression
of value judgments and the underlying rationale than by the
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attempted expression of these facts and judgments through
the sole use of numerical values. The tabular approach
permits the orderly presentation of systems capability data
so that their impact on the evaluation can be readily
discerned and discussed along with the significant interre-
lationships. Thus, conclusions can be reached by visible,
traceable means. [Ref. 27:p. 136]
9 . Step 9; Perform Sensitivity Analysis
In many instances the outcome of a cost-effective-
ness analysis is very sensitive to the assumptions made. In
such cases the conclusions reached may be unknowingly yet
significantly biased by the innocuous assumptions essential
to the analysis; for example, the assumptions of a linear
relationship between two parameters may, in fact, be more
accurately depicted by an exponetial relationship (such as
weight versus reliability, cost versus CEP, unit procure-
ment cost versus total quantity procured) , or an exponen-
tial-appearing relationship may, in reality, flatten out to
a Gompertzian curve. To be assured that the results are not
dependent upon such biases, it is essential that a
sensitivity analysis be performed. In this analysis, the
assumptions that were made initially are modified, different
values of the variables are assumed, and then the impact of
the variations on the resultant evaluation is determined.
If the results of the analysis are shown to be very
sensitive to certain assumptions, either sound justification
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for the use of the assumed values must be developed or the
sensitivity of the conclusions to the assumed values should
be indicated and emphasized. [Ref. 27:p. 138]
10 . Step 10; Document Bases of Previous Nine Steps
A cost-effectiveness evaluation is incomplete
without a detailed documentation of its purpose and assump-
tions, the methodology employed, and the conclusions
reached. Without such documentation, a clear understanding
of the significance and limitations of the conclusion (s) is
unavailable. No prudent decision-maker would base a major
decision on blind trust in the analyst and his conclusions.
There is no substitute for a clear understanding of the
evaluation to lend credibility (not necessarily agreement)
to the results. Particular emphasis should be placed on
lucide documentation of the following.
1. Specific goals to be attained.
2. Essential requirements of those goals, along with
associated assumptions.
3. System capabilities and associated assumptions.
4. System costs and associated assumptions (learning
curves, times, quantities, and so on)
.
5. System evaluation and associated assumptions (scenar-
ios, criteria, and so on)
.
6. Conclusions—their limitations and sensitivity.
The use of highly esoteric mathematics should be
discouraged. By expending some effort, imagination, and
thought, the analyst can usually suitably portray complex
mathematical relationship in simplified (perhaps graphic)
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form. It should be recognized that no judicious manager or
administrator can be expected to endorse a conclusion or
recommendation whose rationale and derivation he cannot
fully understand. It is the responsibility of the analyst
to present the documentation in an appropriate manner. It
is deemed preferable to use simple, understandable
techniques so as to arrive at an acceptable near-optimum
recommendation that is implemented rather than to use eso-
teric techniques to define a precise optimum recommendation
that runs the risk of being relegated to dust-gathering
because the responsible decision-maker (s) can neither follow
nor comprehend the rationale underlying the techniques
employed. [Ref. 27:p. 139]
In summary, the following conclusions are made
regarding this cost-effective analysis decision-making
process:
1. The standardized approach presented herein is not the
only valid way to conduct a cost-effectiveness evalua-
tion, but it has been applied successfully and is
readily understandable.
2. Use of the approach described is not a guarantee to a
successful evaluation, in that judgment and experience
are still required. However, the specific areas that
are very sensitive to experience and perceptive judg-
ment are identified, so that particular attention may
be focused on them.
3. Use of this approach will make possible the focusing
of disagreement on very specific points. Heretofore,
the lack of acceptance of the results of an evaluation
has generally resulted in a blanket indictment of
cost-effectiveness per se. By ready identification of
specific points, additional research done, or more
extensive sensitivity analyses performed, so as to
resolve disagreements, will thus make possible the
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achievement of a rational consensus—which, after all,
is one of the practical products of cost effectiveness
evaluations.
If advanced mathematical techniques provide insight or
even reveal uniquely the most desirable system, the
analyst should place major emphasis on simplifying the
mathematical complexity of the analysis maker. Pride
in the mathematical complexity of the analysis should
be exchanged for pride in the clarity, validity, and
comprehensibility of the evaluation. Admittedly, not
all complex problems can be solved by simple techni-
ques, but disallusion to the mathematical sophistica-
tion of the analytical process does not lend credence
to the answers obtained.
This approach is admittedly an initial step at forma-
lizing the methodology for conducting cost-effective-
ness evaluations. It does provide a much-needed frame
of reference for the diverse elements that can be
introduced into an evaluation. The standardized
approach presented constitutes a road map to the
conduct of cost-effectiveness evaluations. [Ref.
27:p. 149]
C. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MULTI-ATTRIBUTE MODEL
One possible way to accomplish the 10 step cost-
effectiveness evaluation on system safety is by use of
system effectiveness models. In the ensuing section, system
effectiveness is defined and a multi-attribute system
effectiveness model is briefly explained. The reason for
this overview of system effectiveness is that is is
conceivably possible to use a system effectiveness model to
determine and/or measure the cost-effectiveness of system
safety in the development of a weapon system.
System Effectiveness deals with the capability of a
system to meet its mission objectives when called upon to do
so. For a weapon system, this would mean the capability to
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be launched, fly the required distance, and destroy the
target. In the broadest sense, it also includes the capa-
bility of the program to meet cost and schedule goals. To
be effective, a system must be both ready and sustainable .
[Ref. 26:p. 16-1]
Current DOD major system acquisition strategy is to
build a system to meet readiness objectives, test for
readiness, and if successful, field the system. If
unsuccessful, modifications are to be incorporated prior to
deployment.
There are many factors affecting readiness and sustain-
ability. Major items include: reliability, availability,
maintainability, (commonly called RAM) ; logistic
responsiveness, including manpower training, support
equipment, facilities, spares, and data; and funding for
development, test, procurement, and operations. Of critical
importance in assuring the effectiveness is the correct
definition of the threat and the operating environment by
the user. A system which responds to the wrong requirements
cannot be cost effective.
System Effectiveness functions and responsibilities
include:
• Perform reliability analyses and make reliability
allocations
• Establish availability of the system
• Perform safety and hazard analysis
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• Perform Failure Modes and Effects analysis and establish
single point failures
• Prepare Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) control
plan, perform Electromagnetic Interference analysis, and
conduct EMC testing
• Review design for EMC compliance
• Analyze contamination sources, prepare contamination
control plan, perform contamination investigations
• Prepare maintainability plan, establish maintainability
timeliness
• Define acceptable parts, materials, and processes and
set up control system to ensure manufacturing compliance
• Analyze designs to ensure that appropriate engineering
principles have been incorporated
• Define the threat environment and establish survivabili-
ty requirements.
Measures of system effectiveness, often called figures-
of-merit, can provide a quantitative means of comparing
alternative system configurations or comparing proposed
changes with a baseline configuration. This requires
integrating specialty areas into the system process to
ensure a quality product.
Currently within DOD, one way to evaluate a system's
effectiveness is with the aid of reliability, availability,
maintainability, (RAM) and capability math models.
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Figure 5.3 Systems Effectiveness Composition
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Availability is defined in terms of time-related factors of
reliability and maintainability as follows:
• Mean-Time-Before-Failure (MTBF) is a reliability
function which assumes that operation occurs after early
failure (infant mortality) and prior to wear-out, i.e.,
a constant failure rate exists.
• Mean-Time-To-Reapir (MTTR) , as a maintenance function,
can include corrective maintenance time (CMT) and
preventive maintenance time (PMT)
.
• Mean-Logistics-Down-Time (MLDT) is a maintenance-related
logistics function which involves spares provisioning
and includes logistic delay time (LDT) and administra-
tive delay time (ADT)
.
Three types of availability are commonly used with the above
context—Inherent Availability (Aj) , Achieved Availability
(A;^) , and Operational Availability (Aq) .
Readiness and sustainability objectives are identified
during the Concept Exploration phase, together with funding
requirements. In the Demonstration/Validation phase,
reliability and maintainability concepts are incorporated
into the requirements and design; and support concepts,
maintenance levels, sparing policy, and skill requirements
are identified. In the FSD phase, readiness objectives are
validated through testing, and detailed support plans are
prepared. During Production and Deployment, support
resources are procured and readiness objectives verified
through field tests.
This effort is accomplished primarily by the engineering
specialties, which are usually assigned to System




System effectiveness models provide a means of
evaluating alternate system configurations with respect to
effectiveness categories of cost, schedule, availability,
and performance. Figure 5.4 illustrates a multi-attribute
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Figure 5.4 Multi-Attribute System Effectiveness Model
major categories such as standardization, "system safety,"
preplanned product improvement, productivity, and such could
be added if these were defined as major program objectives.
Lower levels of attributes provide quantitative measures
which permit evaluation and ranking of candidate
configurations. Each attribute is assigned a percentage of
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the total system effectiveness (100) based on its relative
importance of meeting mission objectives. For example, both
schedule and performance are assigned the highest weights
(30) . At the next level down, these values are apportioned
to specific measurables again according to their perceived
value to overall missions objectives. In the performance
area, these include: circular error probability, lethality,
range and response time. These are identified as technical
performance measurements. The model may be carried one or
more levels further down, if desired, to provide visibility
into the actual subsystem design parameters which comprise
the top-level measurables. [Ref. 26p. 16-5]
Individual attributes in the model are then represented
by utility function curves as shown in Figure 5.5. The
utility curve represents the benefit (weight) for an
achieved attribute value. Each curve covers the range from
the maximum possible value (beyond which no further benefits
accrue to the system) , to the minimum acceptable value
(below which minimum mission objectives cannot be met) .
[Ref. 26:p. 16-5]
The curves are established through discussions with
users, operational personnel, program management, and others
with knowledge of the program objectives, "often starting
with a purely arbitrary curve ." The shape of the curve is
dependent upon the criticality of meeting the desired value
and the risk that the program is willing to accept. That
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Figure 5.5 Utility Function Curves
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is, curves that show a rapid decrease in weighing value as
the attribute value departs from its maximum indicate that
the perfoirmance is critical to achieving mission success
and/or that the program is risk averse in this area. A
linear curve represents a risk neutral position over the
acceptable range of parameter values. [Ref. 26:p. 16-6]
Scoring is accomplished by specialists in each area to
define the expected range of values (minimum, maximum, most
likely) . A distribution curve is then established from the
responses for each attribute for each configuration. The
weight of each attribute can then be established and the
totals for each configuration scored. When the total scores
are close (within 10 percent) , sensitivity analyses can be
conducted using maximum and minimum values to establish the
least-risk case. [Ref. 26:p. 16-6]
120
VI. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS/CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the cost-
effectiveness of system safety in the development of a
weapon system. In trying to answer this research question,
a one week research trip was made to the following
commands: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM)
,
Washington, D.C.; Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC)
Lakehurst, New Jersey; and Naval Air Test Center (NATO)
Patuxent River, Maryland. An overview of the findings of
this trip are provided.
The organization for System Safety within the Navy is
shown in Figure 6.1.
NAVAIRSYSCOM 's Director of Safety (AIR-09F) provides
policy guidance and management assistance. The System
Safety Coordinator (AIR-516C) advises program management and
field activities on technically adequate system safety
programs. NAEC and NATO are field activities to NAVAIRSYS-
COM. Field Activities provide system safety engineers to
work system safety programs under the direction of AIR-516C.
Per the flowchart, AIR-516C is within the Systems and
Engineering Department (AIR-05) . Even though AIR-516C is a
component of AIR-05, it hasn't received much support for






























PROJECT MCMT t SUPPORT »OLiCT GUIDANCE 'ecmnical direction
Figure 6.1 Organization for System Safety
one system safety engineer and one system safety engineering
trainer. These two people are responsible for not only
ensuring system safety program requirements are placed in
various contractual documents but monitoring the progress of
approximately 100 different aviation programs.
NAEC has a team of approximately twenty system safety
engineers who assist AIR-516C via various class desk
officers in managing system safety programs. A system
safety manager oversees and provides guidance to these
system safety engineers.
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The class desk officer is the project engineering
director. A class desk officer exists for each naval
aircraft (i.e., F-18, CH-53, P-3) at NAVAIRSYSCOM. The
class desk officer is responsible for funding NATC and NAEC
system safety engineers to perform various system safety
tasks. The class desk officer is also responsible for
ensuring that system safety is addressed as a distinct item
during all program reviews (i.e., preliminary and critical
design reviews)
.
The NAEC team of system safety engineers was formulated
to assist AIR-516C in the difficult task of monitoring high
level aircraft weapon system developments. The current team
of engineers are younger and have only a few years of
engineering experience. Even though the team consists of
younger engineers, they are dedicated to ensuring system
safety requirements are fulfilled. Problems that currently
exist in monitoring system safety program requirements at
NAEC are as follows:
1) NAEC is a field activity to NAVAIR and yet NAEC system
safety engineers work more or less directly for the
class desk officer. The commanding officer of NAEC
sometimes tasks the team with other requirements which
hampers their ability to perform critical system
safety tasks;
2) Office working conditions are below standards.
Engineers are working in cramped spaces with no
privacy;
3) The team is somewhat isolated from what is going on in
the naval aviation community. Frequent trips must be
made to NAVAIRSYSCOM which is a 4-5 hour drive from
NAEC.
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NATC has approximately two system safety engineers at
each aircraft directorate (i.e., rotary wing, strike, and
anti-submarine warfare) who also assist AIR-516C via the
class desk officer. A NATC staff assistant for system
safety provides technical guidance to the various NATC
system safety engineers and annually audits each NATC system
safety program for conformance to system safety
requirements
.
NATC is different from NAEC in that NATC engineers
assist NAEC engineers in managing system safety programs.
The reason for this is that NAEC is considered the center of
excellence for aircraft system safety and as such is project
principle for system safety and keeps track of all hazards
identified on each aircraft program.
NATC's role then is to analyze research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) system safety information and
supply it to both the class desk officer and NAEC system
safety project engineers. NATC engineers have somewhat of
an edge over NAEC engineers because they have direct access
to aircraft that are being used for (RDT&E) . This direct
access allows NATC engineers to have more hands-on
experience in performing system safety tasks (i.e., they can
directly see an aircraft that has safety design flaws or get
timely information after a test flight)
.
Data obtained from this research trip and from various
data searches and telephone conversations was not sufficient
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to perform an in-depth cost-effectiveness analysis of system
safety. In performing this analysis it would have been
appropriate to acquire cost data and aircraft mishap
statistics on various aircraft programs to compare and
analyze the data. On past and current aircraft programs,
system safety isn't broken out as a separate line item for
costing in aircraft contracts. This made it impossible to
find out what various contractors are specifically spending
on system safety program requirements. A brief overview of
data which was considered to be important in making some
general assumptions regarding the cost-effectiveness of
system safety will be reviewed.
The all-Navy mishap rate-'- is presented in Figure 6.2.
This figure points out various safety programs that have
been implemented since 1954. As depicted in the graph, the
Navy mishap rate has been declining. Two views presently
exist on maintaining and/or further decreasing the Navy's
already low mishap rate. They are: 1) train Navy pilots to
be more safety conscious, or 2) better technology. Each of
these views make sense but why isn't System Safety
considered a viable alternative? Most likely it is because
-'-Mishape rate—mishap rates are generically determined
as follows:
Total flight hours for all-navy aircraft for one year = x
100,000
Total Class A mishaps for that same year _ Mishap rate for
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Figure 6.2 All-Navy Mishap Rate
not everyone is aware of the system safety concept and what
it can do in preventing aircraft mishaps. The inability of
system safety to be quantifiably measured in obtaining
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operational effectiveness requirements is considered a
contributing factor.
Figure 6.3 shows costs of Class A mishaps in 1986
dollars. Fiscal year 1986 wasn't a good year for aircraft
mishap costs. In 1986 aircraft mishap costs were $221
million. $221 million only represents aircraft costs. It
does not include costs due to injury or death. Even though
the Navy may be having fewer mishaps, the aircraft that were
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This is what each type of navy aircraft costs in
thousands of dollars:
Aircraft Column A Column B
F/A-18 $22,800 $33,880







Column A is per the Naval Safety Center and represents what
each aircraft cost when originally acquired. The Naval
Safety Center data was used in Figure 6.3. Column B is per
Aviation Week and Space Technology and represents current
replacement costs. There is quite a difference. Aviation
Week and Space Technology cost figures are a truer
indication of what a Naval aircraft would cost to replace in
1986 dollars.
Major reasons for Class A mishpas are as follows.
Figure 6.4 shows All Navy/Marine Class A mishaps by phase of
operations. As shown, most accidents occur in flight.
Figure 6.5 shows causal factors for Class A mishaps.
Most mishaps are due to pilot error but material failure is
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Figure 6.4 All Navy/Marine Class A Flight & Flight
Related Mishaps by Phase of OPS,
CY 80-86
1. Misuse of flight controls
2. Violation of regulations/ fl ight manual
3. Physical/mental condition
4. Inadequate flight preparation
5. Faulty performance by other pilot in aircraft
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Figure 6.5 All Navy/Marine Class A Flight & Flight
Related Mishaps by Cause Factor, CY 81-
85, Average Number per year
6. Failure to maintain flying speed
7. Failure to recognize a dangerous situation
8. General errors in judgment
9. Misjudgment of distance/altitude/position.
Mr. Jim Gibble, NAVAIRSYSCOM ' s Director of Safety (AIR-
09F) , states that:
system safety can improve not on material failure mishap
causal factors but pilot error mishap causal factors by
having human factors and design engineers to not only
consult with system safety engineers but to have them
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ensure that system safety hazards are either eliminated or
controlled to an acceptable level during an aircraft
weapon system's development.
Figure 6.6 shows safety improvement in navy fighter
aircraft mishaps during the first 100,000 flight hours. The
F/A-18 exhibits a far better accident rate than its
predecessors
.
The F-14A had a modest system safety program. No navy
system safety expertise was available. Although the initial
mishap rate was significantly lower than expected, inflight
fires and engine problems resulted in a significant number
of mishaps. The Logistics Management Institute estimates
that the engineering change costs to correct safety
deficiencies over the life of a program is $110 million.
One causative agent for inflight fires on the F-14A was the
design of a radar liquid cooling system. The fires
originated when the cooling fluid sprayed from a failed
elapsed time indicator onto hot surfaces or electrical
equipment which caused ignition. Before the problem was
identified and corrected, $12.8 million was lost in mishaps
and was a suspected causal factor in two other unexplained
F-14A losses. If the potential for a coolant leak had been
anticipated, corrective action could have been taken during
the development cycle. With increased emphasis on system
safety this type of problem can be identified during the
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In summary, the F-18 had a more extensive system safety
program and is a good example of what an aggressive system
safety effort can contribute to the Navy. The cumulative
F/A-18 class A mishap rate is 7.07 per 100,000 flight hours.
The F-14A Class A rate at equivalent flight hours was 18.42.
If the F-18 system safety effort prevented the loss of only
one F/A-18, that would save the Navy $22.8 million.
Currently, the benefit/cost ratio of system safety is
thought to be betwee 4 to 1 . Without further analysis, it
is impossible to determine an exact ratio. What is apparent
is that system safety can pay for itself in the development
of a weapon system if it only saves the loss of one
expensive aircraft.
B. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion of my analysis of the cost-effectiveness
of system safety, system safety has received federal
regulatory approval per DODINST 5000.36, "System Safety
Engineering and Management." Executive Order 12291 was
previously discussed somewhat in-depth. Per Executive Order
12291, regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh
the potential costs to society. In this regard, system
safety should be viewed as having benefits that outweigh its
costs to society.
Naval Air Systems Command directs that system safety
shall be required in the development of all ACAT I and II
133
aircraft programs. This requirement hasn't received the
emphasis that maybe it should be receiving. It was
discussed that system safety is considered an engineering
specialty in the system engineering process. In the real
world system safety doesn't seem to play a major role in
either determining technical performance measurements or in
obtaining system effectiveness objectives. Yet, system
engineering specialties are required to ensure system
operability
.
The system effectiveness model which was described is a
possible way of determining the cost-effectiveness of system
safety. Even though system safety isn't a component of the
model, it is felt that system safety has positive effects in
obtaining system effectiveness objectives.
The reason system safety isn't used as a determining
factor in the effectiveness of a system may have to do with
the fact that it is not perceived as an integral requirement
in meeting the program objectives of cost, schedule, and
performance though it should be.
System safety really encompasses the overall program by
identifying hazards and minimizing risks through the entire
life cycle of a system. System safety focuses not only on
the total system but virtually every component of the
system. Ideally a system and its components should function
safely forever. In the real world this is impossible (i.e.
an airplane engine is going to quit running now and then or
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a control system may infrequently fail to operate)
.
Therefore, the goal of system safety is to reduce such
malfunctions as much as possible.
Although project managers and design and engineering
forces usually have safety considerations on their mind as
they go about designing manufacturing, producing, and
maintaining a system, it is really important to assign a
team of safety engineers to be a part of this process. The
system safety team scrutinizes various components and,
utilizing historical and empirical data, mishap reports, and
their own engineering knowledge and experience, system
safety engineers not only examine components on an
individual basis, but take measures to ensure that
components function properly when combined with others.
They are concerned with the "total package" as well as the
separate parts. Their attention to the "total" system in
essence enhances the quality of the system and contributes
not only to the performance of the system but to the
reduction of future costs by having not only fewer aircraft
mishaps but by producing a more reliable, maintainable, and
safer system.
C. RECOMMENDATION
This thesis did not answer the primary and subsidiary
research questions as it was intended to do. An inability
to get adequate data was the major contributor. In summary,
it is strongly recommended that the information which has
135
which has been provided in this thesis be used in a follow-
on thesis so that a more in-depth analysis of the cost-
effectiveness of system safety can be accomplished.
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APPENDIX
NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 3 53 4—A SYSTEM SAFETY MODEL
FOR DEPARTMENTAL AIRCRAFT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document presents some basic tenets of safety as
applied to developmental aircraft programs. It does not
discuss the philosophy of system safety nor does it present
instructions for applying system safety principles to a
project. Rather, the integration of safety into the project
management aspects of planning, organizing, directing, and
controlling is illustrated by examples. The examples
presented here are taken from the joint NASA/Army Rotor
System Research Aircraft (RSRA) project which has maintained
an enviable safety record through several years of
development and operation.
The RSRA project was initiated in 1973 to produce
vehicles for conducting advanced rotor systems research.
The project resulted in production of two highly
instrumented aircraft capable of flying in the fixed-wing,
helicopter or compound modes. The specifications
established a performance envelope that exceeded normal
helicopter performance in many ways while stressing
adaptability to new rotor systems, precisely controlled test
conditions, and measurement accuracy. Fulfillment of these
specifications required advancement of state-of-the-art
technology in many areas, such as provision for crew escape
in an emergency. It also required close coordination
between NASA and contractor personnel. This, in turn,
necessitated formulation of unusual communication protocols
which fostered development of a "project family" attitude.
The RSRA project office was originally based at Langley
Research Center and operated within confines of a typically
austere research and development budget. During later
stages of development the project was transferred to the
Ames Research Center resulting in general loss of corporate
memory and necessitating changes in the system safety
program to compensate for this loss.
To begin an overview of the RSRA safety program, it
would be well to understand the attitude and philosophy of
the former RSRA Project Manager/Chief Engineer, Sam White,
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Jr. His approach to safety on the project was guided by the
following philosophy:
The system safety program that evolved on the RSRA was
based on a set of concepts, some basic system safety
principles, and on a fairly limited set of guidance
documents. A list of some pretty basic (yet very useful)
principles was used in developing the RSRA system safety
program (courtesy of Chuck Miller's George Washington
University program on aviation safety)
:
a. Accidents are unplanned, but controllable combina-
tions of events.
b. Accidents are rare; hazards (risks) are not.
c. Combinations of "acceptable" hazards produce
accidents.
d. Accidents are usually caused by a sequence of
complex cause-effect relationships that may be
obscured by simplistic probable/proximate cause
determinations
.
e. Cause-prevention determination should include
factors of:
Man (human error, workload)
Machine (failure, design defect)
- Medium (environment)




f. Safety is an integral part of mission accomplishment
(economic, survival)
.
g. Accident prevention is more than accident investiga-
tion and cause-corrective action determination.
h. Managers/supervisors can delegate/assign safety
authority/actions but cannot delegate
accountability.
i. A data bank of known precedents exists for risks and
corrective actions.
j . Hazard/accident reporting must emphasize corrective
action, including rule enforcement, without seeking
to punish improper action.
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k. Human hyperawareness of high risk often results in a
higher level of safety.
1. Safety tasks are finite, identifiable, definable,
and do-able. Competently done, they reduce
accidents.
Define requirements (process and results, not
procedures: What, not how)
Prepare plans (road map, who/what/when)
Conduct hazard analyses
Develop emergency as well as normal procedures
Conduct program reviews (use jury approach)
Influence behavior (educate, train, indoctrinate,
motivate, correct)
Conduct surveys, audits, inspections
- Use known precedent centers
Investigate accidents/incidents (determine cause,
take corrective action, follow-up)
Provide staff "Chaplain," ombudsman (opens free
communication, emphasizes correction, deempha-
sizes punishment, provides liaison)
.
The list of safety tasks under the last bullet is particu-
larly useful in planning a system safety program.
The applications of these and the other basic principles
are illustrated in detail throughout the text.
The methods by which safety would be achieved were
documented in an Air-worthiness Qualification Plan (AQP)
developed early in the project. The requirements specified
by the AQP were carefully tailored to fit the specific RSRA
mission objectives and to satisfy the intent of agency
criteria.
The RSRA project budget did not permit a large safety
cadre. Therefore, a safety focal point was established and
the entire project staff became involved in the attainment
of safety objectives. Safety goals became project goals and
increased safety consciousness of the staff resulted.
Resource allocations were altered when necessary to provide
for performance of safety tasks of most benefit. This
"horse-trading" of resources involved some risk which
project management accepted when necessary, but as a
conscious act, not through ignorance or default. This bold
stance was justified because management remained deeply
involved in safety activities throughout project
development.
In the final synopsis of RSRA safety experience, it
should be noted that safety goals were given in terms of
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positive actions. That is, negative connotations were
avoided with reference to safety, and attitudes were
fostered to keep safety in concert with other project
activities.
It was recognized early in the project that even ultra-
attention to safety in the design and ground test phases
would not assure operational safety without in-depth
knowledge and awareness by the flight team. For this
reason, both Government and contractor flight crews were
involved throughout the design, development, test and
evaluation (DDT&E) process.
While the RSRA experience was not a perfect example of
"doing everything right," it came close. Some painful
lessons were learned, especially relative to safety impacts
of schedule slippages, transfers of roles and missions, and
associated loss of corporate memory. However, flexibility
was found to be a key. When events beyond project
management control led to schedule impacts, slippage was
allowed, but not loss of project control.
In the words of the RSRA Chief Engineer,
The fact that the project matured effectively and without
incident is believed to be a direct result of the breadth
and depth of safety planning and the in-depth involvement
of all hands in safety plan implementation. The point is
that the energies devoted to safety tasks are not all
penalties to be suffered out of the need for safety; they
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